Company Liability for a Life Insurance Agent\u27s Financial Abuse of an Elderly Client by Parker, Johnny
University of Tulsa College of Law
TU Law Digital Commons
Articles, Chapters in Books and Other Contributions to Scholarly Works
2007
Company Liability for a Life Insurance Agent's
Financial Abuse of an Elderly Client
Johnny Parker
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/fac_pub
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by TU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles, Chapters in Books
and Other Contributions to Scholarly Works by an authorized administrator of TU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
daniel-bell@utulsa.edu.
Recommended Citation
2007 Mich. St. L. Rev. 683.
COMPANY LIABILITY FOR A LIFE INSURANCE
AGENT'S FINANCIAL ABUSE OF AN ELDERLY
CLIENT
Johnny Parker"
2007 MICH. ST. L. REv. 683
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................... 684
1. THE PERFECT STORM ........................................................................... 687
A . The Econom y ............................................................................... 687
B. Technology and Information Sharing ......................................... 688
C. An Aging Population ................................................................... 689
D. The Proliferation of Titles Used by Investment Professionals .... 690
E. Life Insurance Agent's Advantages ............................................ 690
II. THE EXTENT OF THE PROBLEM ............................................................ 691
III. A LIFE INSURANCE AGENT'S FINANCIAL ELDER ABUSE STORY ........ 695
IV. THE LEGAL BASIS FOR HOLDING A COMPANY LIABLE FOR AN AGENT'S
T O RT .................................................................................................... 699
A. Respondeat Superior .................................................................... 699
B. Apparent Authority or Aided by Existence of the Agency
R elationship ................................................................................. 7 10
1. Apparent Authority ............................................................... 710
2. Aided by the Existence of the Agency Relationship .............. 714
C . D irect Liability ............................................................................ 716
1. D uty ....................................................................................... 7 17
a. Foreseeable Risks ........................................................... 717
b. Limited Duty/Special Relationship ................................ 718
2. Proxim ate Cause ................................................................... 719
D. Non-Delegable Duty .................................................................... 720
C ON CLU SION .............................................................................................. 72 1
* Professor of Law, University of Tulsa College of Law; B.A., 1982, University of
Mississippi; J.D., 1984, University of Mississippi College of Law; LL.M., 1986, Columbia
University College of Law.
Michigan State Law Review
The character of a society is measured by how it treats those of its members
who are at the dawn of life, its children, how it treats those of its members
who are in the shadows of life, its poor, its sick, its handicapped, and how it
treats those of its members who are in the twilight of life, its elderly.
-Tom Lantos1
INTRODUCTION
The elderly represent a rapidly increasing percentage of the American
population. In July 2003, 35.9 million people-12 percent of the country's
total population-were age 65 and older.2 Among those age 65 and older,
18.3 million people were age 65 to 74; 12.9 million were age 75 to 84; and
4.7 million were 85 and older in 2003.? The fastest growing age group be-
tween 1980-1990 was 85 to 90 years.4 For the period between 1990-2000,
the fastest growing age group was 90 to 95 years.5 According to actuarial
predictions, by the year 2010, 39 million Americans will be over age 65;
and, by 2050, 10 percent of the United States population will be over 85.6
Consider also that in the United States alone, a citizen turns 50 once
every seven seconds.7 On January 1, 2006, the first of an estimated 77 mil-
lion baby boomers, Americans born between 1946 and 1964 celebrated their
60th birthday. By 2030, the number of elderly is expected to nearly double
to 72 million people-a whopping 20 percent of the total U.S. population.'
Currently, people over 50 control 70 percent of the nation's wealth and with
1. Physical and Financial Abuse of the Elderly: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Retirement Income & Employment of the Select Comm. on Aging, 97th Cong. 8 (1981) [here-
inafter Physical and Financial Abuse of the Elderly] (testimony of Tom Lantos, Rep.).
2. WAN HE ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, 65+ IN
THE UNITED STATES: 2005, at 1 (2005), http://www.census.gov/prod/2006pubs/p23-209.pdf.
3. Id.
4. RONALD J. SCHWARTZ, LAW AND AGING: ESSENTIALS OF ELDERLY LAW 2 (2005).
5. Id.
6. Id. at 1-2.
7. Longevity Archives, Boomers' Power: A Baby Boomer Manifesto, http://-
www.nextfiftyyears.com/longevity/ (Aug. 7, 2006).
8. Protecting Senior Citizens Against Investment Fraud: Hearing Before the Spe-
cial Comm. on Aging, 109th Cong. (2006) [hereinafter Protecting Senior Citizens Against
Investment Fraud] (testimony of Patricia D. Struck, Wisconsin Securities Division Adminis-
trator, President, North American Securities Administrators Association, Inc.), available at
http://www.nasaa.org/Issues Answers/LegislativeActivity/Testimony/4503.cfm.
9. WAN HE ET AL., supra note 2, at 12.
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continued longevity are destined to become the targets of choice for scam
artists and con men. 0
Seniors" are not immune from the evils that plague society at large.
Like their child counterparts, they too often find themselves the victims of
abuse. Elder abuse and neglect can take many forms, including physical,
psychological, and financial. 2 Financial abuse is the most common form of
elder abuse. 3 The elderly have become the victims of choice for con men
because (1) they are most likely to have a "nest egg," own their homes,
and/or have excellent credit; (2) they are polite and trusting; (3) seniors are
less likely to report fraud because they do not know to whom to report it,
are too ashamed at having been defrauded, or do not know they have been
defrauded; and (4) when they do report fraud, they often make poor wit-
nesses, due to the effect of age on memory. In summary, the elderly are
prime targets of scam artists because they are perceived as more trusting,
less aware of their surroundings, and easier to handle.
The National Center on Elder Abuse estimates that there are five mil-
lion cases of financial elder exploitation annually, with most going unre-
ported by seniors who are either too embarrassed about being duped or are
unaware that the theft is happening. 4 This dilemma is further accentuated
by the fact that baby boomers possess more than $8.5 trillion in investable
assets and are expected, over the next forty years, to inherit at least $7 tril-
lion from their parents. 5 Thus, financial abuse of the elderly has become a
dilemma of epic proportions.
Financial abuse of the elderly can take many forms and can be catego-
rized on the basis of a number of distinct characteristics. In an attempt to
draw attention to the problem, the range of potentially abusive activities has
been classified into four main categories: (1) theft; (2) fraud; (3) intentional
10. Susanna Schrobsdorff, Financial Fraud of the Elderly on the Rise, NEWSWEEK,
July 19, 2005, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8631060/site/newsweek/print/l/displaymod-
e/1098/(1of4)5/8/26.
11. I define senior citizens as those ages sixty-five and older. I use the term "sen-
iors," "elder," "elderly," "older population," and "older Americans" interchangeably.
12. Margaret F. Hudson, Elder Mistreatment: A Taxonomy with Definitions by Del-
phi, 3 J. ELDER ABUSE & NEGLECT 1, 14 (1991). Physical violence, including negligence, is
the most common form of abuse, followed by financial abuse, the abrogation of basic consti-
tutional rights, and psychological abuse. Physical and Financial Abuse of the Elderly, supra
note 1, at 3.
13. Duhaime Law, Elder Abuse, http://www.duhaime.org/LegalResources/Poli-
ceStation/tabid/334/articleType/ArticleView/articleld/55/Elder-Abuse.aspx (last visited Dec.
27, 2007).
14. Schrobsdorff, supra note 10.
15. Protecting Senior Citizens Against Investment Fraud, supra note 8. See also
Kathy Chu, Financial Scams Expected to Boom as Boomers Age, USA TODAY, May 17,
2006, available at http://www.usatoday.com/money/perfi/retirement/2006-02-05-baby-
boomers-usat x.htm.
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breach of duty by a fiduciary or caregiver; and (4) negligence. 6 Though
these categories constitute distinct forms of financial abuse, a certain
amount of overlap exists. 7 For example, misuse of an elder's assets by a
fiduciary can overlap with fraud, theft, or embezzlement. This type of fi-
nancial abuse is amorphous because its parameters are defined by the rela-
tionship of the abuser and the victim, rather than by the type of conduct
involved.
It is also possible to further refine financial elder abuse into two classi-
fications. The first refinement is typically committed by someone with a
personal relationship to the victim, such as a family member, friend, or care-
taker who has gained the victim's trust in order to take advantage of that
trust. 8 The second type is referred to as commercial elder abuse and is
practiced by organized businesses."' Rather than resorting to outright theft,
"[t]he commercial abuser acts under color of a business enterprise to obtain
access to the elder's assets."2  These classifications, however, are also
amorphous because an abuser, such as a life insurance agent, can rely on
both the personal relationship with the victim and the guise of his apparent
business enterprise, in order to take advantage of the victim.
Financial abuse of the elderly is not exclusive to the blue collar scam
artist.2' The considerations that make the elderly attractive to blue collar
con men also serve as the impetus for financial elder abuse by reputable
institutions and their professional employees. These institutions, uniquely
aware of the nation's changing demographics and the desire of most seniors
to maximize their retirement investments, all too frequently participate in
the financial fleecing of the elderly." They have launched all-out marketing
campaigns in which cold callers, brokers, financial planners, and insurance
agents pitch dubious investment products and strategies to seniors. In the
white collar context, financial elder abuse often takes the form of invest-
ment fraud.23
16. Carolyn L. Dessin, Financial Abuse of the Elderly, 36 IDAHO L. REv. 203, 206
(2000).
17. Id.
18. See Kurt Eggert, Lashed to the Mast and Crying for Help: Self-Limitations of
Autonomy Can Protect Elders from Predatory Lending, 36 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 693, 697-98
(2003).
19. Id. at 698.
20. Id.
21. See ALBERT B. LEWIS, GOTCHA! SWINDLES, SCAMS, CONS AND RIP-OFFS (1998).
22. Nat'l Comm. for the Prevention of Elder Abuse, Financial Abuse,
http://www.preventelderabuse.org/elderabuse/Finabuse.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2007);
Prevent Elder Abuse, Predators and Politics, http://preventelderabuse.blogsp-
ot.com/2007/07/predators-and-politics.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2007).
23. Helpguide.org, Elder Abuse: Types, Signs, Symptoms, Causes, and Help,
http://www.helpguide.org/mental/elder-abuse-physical-emotional-sexual-neglect.htm (last
visited Nov. 21, 2007); Prevent Elder Abuse, supra note 22. See also infra notes 49-63.
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The purpose of this Article is to examine the life insurance industry's
role in financial elder abuse. Part I explains why elders are perfect fraud
victims for life insurance companies and agents. It examines the intrinsic
and extrinsic considerations that make elderly people the perfect prey for
predators, such as rogue life insurance agents. Part II explores the extent
to which insurance agents engage in financial elder abuse. While financial
elder abuse is frequently attributed to a minority of unscrupulous insurance
agents, Part II demonstrates that the problem is more widespread than the
life insurance industry is prepared to acknowledge. Part III describes the
story of one life insurance agent's financial elder abuse case that occurred in
Oklahoma and culminated in litigation in 2005. While the story is typical in
many respects, it was chosen primarily because of the agent's response
when the scam was finally detected. Part III demonstrates that elders who
are financially victimized by their insurance agents rarely, if ever, received
full financial compensation. Consequently, Part III serves as the launch pad
for the primary thesis: making out a case of company liability for a life in-
surance agent's financial elder abuse. Part IV explores the traditional legal
theories typically used to impute liability to employers for torts committed
by employees. This Part explains each theory in detail with emphasis on its
appropriateness in the context of financial elder abuse.
I. THE PERFECT STORM
In a perfect storm, a number of significant conditions come together to
create a devastating consequence. The significant conditions necessary for
a perfect storm for life insurance fraud are in place, and the nation's elderly
are most at risk. While not all inclusive, a laundry list of significant condi-
tions must include: (1) the economy; (2) technology and information shar-
ing; (3) an aging population; (4) the proliferation of titles used by invest-
ment professionals; and (5) general life insurance agents' advantages.
A. The Economy
Due to advancements in science, technology, and medicine, American
citizens are living longer. Consequently, individuals must carefully plan for
their retirement needs if they are to continue to enjoy their pre-retirement
living standards in retirement.
Financing a lengthy retirement necessitates greater savings through
national retirement plans, company pension plans, or private savings. Since
the bear market of 2000-2002, millions of investors, especially seniors, are
seeking lucrative investments to recapture their market losses and further
Michigan State Law Review
grow their retirement assets.2 4 Investor desperation is a motivation for un-
scrupulous institutions and individuals. Seniors are especially vulnerable to
false claims that they can recover their market losses by investing in prod-
ucts that promise high returns with minimal or no risks. "'The troubled
economy has spawned a large spike in insurance scams' .... The scams,
often run by insurance agents, feed on the desire of many older Americans
to make up for lost income during the recent economic downturn."25 As
people age and as retirement planning and, eventually, incomes become
more and more subject to fluctuations in the stock market, investors will
increasingly turn to insurance products to diversify their portfolios.26
B. Technology and Information Sharing
The enactment of the Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999,
also known as the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, removed many of the barriers
that distinguished insurance, commercial banking, and investment bank-
ing.27 Consequently, the lines between these institutions, their services, and
products have become blurred. Banks now sell mutual finds, securities
firms offer checking accounts, and insurance companies offer products for
investment. The integration of the three industries' marketing and other
functions is often referred to as financial modernization.28
Financial institutions collect and maintain enormous amounts of in-
formation about their clientele. Some of the information is provided when
elders apply for and use banking institutions and insurance products. In-
formation may also be purchased or acquired by financial institutions from
24. A Look at History May Help Investors Put the 2 000s in Perspective, UPDATE:
EMPLOYEE BENEFIT NEWS FOR MEMBERS OF AAPG, May 2003,
http://www.aapg.org/member/geovest/2003/05May03.pdf; E.S. Browning, Dow Industrials
End Above 11,000 as Stocks Extend New Year's Rally, WALL ST. J., Jan. 10, 2006, available
at http://webreprints.djreprints.com/sampleWSJHL2cr.pdf; Investment Loses, Trading Wins:
The Greatest Stock Market Mania of All Time, CROSSCURRENTS, available at
http://www.cross-current.net/archives/marO I.htm.
25. Franny Van Nevel, Frauds Against the Elderly: Hang Up the Phone, Lock the
Door, Bury Your Checkbook! (quoting Jim Quiggle, Director of Communications, Coalition
Against Insurance Fraud), http://hffo.cuna.org/10930/article/539/html (last visited Nov. 21,
2007).
26. The primary types of assets used to balance a retirement portfolio are stocks,
bonds, mutual funds, annuities, and cash. Retirement Investing Basics,
http://personalinsure.about.com/b/a/257761.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2007). Annuities are
an insurance product and are unique in that they can provide income for the remainder of the
investor's life. Id.
27. SUMMARY OF FEDERAL FINANCIAL SERVICES MODERNIZATION ACT OF 1999
(GRAMM-LEACH-BLILEY ACT), http://legis.nd.gov/assembly/57-2001/docs/pdf/39150.pdf;
Jolina C. Cuaresma, Business Law: Privacy: Financial Services: The Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 497 (2002).
28. See infra note 29.
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third parties, public entities, and so called "data augmentation" companies.
The information collected by financial institutions, including life insurance
companies, often consists of detailed data about a customer's financial port-
folio and financial plans. 9
The interplay between information technology and finance makes
commercial transactions possible in a matter of seconds. Because individ-
ual record-keeping is now done by computers, the financial status of a con-
sumer can be verified within minutes. The phenomenon of blending confi-
dential personal information and technology with the shift to an instantane-
ous payment system has many commercial advantages. However, this phe-
nomenon also brings with it many perils for the unwary. The sheer instan-
taneity of obtaining financial information and culminating financial transac-
tions can be and is being abused by many life insurance agents.3° For ex-
ample, armed with a laundry list of what is available for the taking, unscru-
pulous agents are less likely to take no for an answer. Thus, the most ap-
prehensive elder is deprived of an opportunity to suggest financial inability
as a reason for not lending or investing money.
C. An Aging Population
The number of elderly citizens in the United States is rapidly growing.
The elderly are vulnerable to life insurance fraud because many suffer from
cognitive deficits, social isolation, and other problems related to the aging
process, which make the elderly easier to deceive.3'
Consider these statistics: An estimated 75 million Americans are due to turn 60
over the next 20 years. That's an average of more than 10,000 people retiring
every day. Households led by people aged 40 or over already own 91% of Amer-
ica's net worth. The impending retirement of the baby boomers will mean that,
very soon, the vast majority of our nation's net worth will be in the hands of the
newly retired.
29. Grayson Barber, Uneasy Access: Privacy Problems in the Financial Moderniza-
tion Act, http://graysonbarber.com/pdf/financialservicesmodemization.pdf; Beth Givens,
Financial Privacy: The Shortcoming of the Federal Financial Services Modernization Act,
Presentation at the Cal. Bar Ass'n Annual Meeting (Sept. 2000), available at
http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/fin_privacy.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2007).
30. The proper role of an insurance agent or financial advisor in an effective infor-
mation system is to advise and provide knowledge of the products, the determination of the
consumer's profile as well as suitability of transactions. These representatives should assist
the customer in her choices and recommend products that are not only adapted to her needs,
but also that best respond to the client's profile. The best interest of the customer's should be
the guiding force in the relationship.
31. Lawrence A. Frolik, Insurance Fraud on the Elderly, TRIAL, June 2001, at 48.
32. Improving Financial Disclosure for Individual Investors, Hearing Before the
Comm. on Banking, Housing, & Urban Affairs, 109th Cong. (2006) (testimony of Christo-
Michigan State Law Review
These two factors-problems associated with the aging process and
assets-indicate the continued growth in both the number and severity of
financial abuse cases involving the elderly.
D. The Proliferation of Titles Used by Investment Professionals
Seniors are more trusting of professionals; consequently, "'[t]he al-
phabet soup of letters after salesperson's names can be confusing or even
deliberately deceptive."' 3   Nevertheless, most consumers, especially the
elderly, trust financial advisors who have credentials "because they assume
that credentials indicate a minimum level of regulatory oversight, as well as
knowledge, training and experience."34 People offering financial advice use
many titles. However, obtaining credentials and titles is not required by
federal or state law.35 According to the American Association of Retired
Persons, many professionals that use titles such as "financial planner" and
"personal financial consultant" are unregulated and have met no minimum
standard requirements.36
The number of the recently created senior-related designations is on
the rise.37 A senior-related designation may imply that the salesperson has
special knowledge, training, or skills on issues important to the elderly. The
training required to receive the designation, however, may be in nothing
more than marketing and selling techniques targeting the elderly.
E. Life Insurance Agent's Advantages
The elderly are common targets of unscrupulous life insurance com-
panies and agents because they (1) are often home throughout the day; (2)
pher Cox, Chairman, Securities & Exchange Commission), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/ts042506cc.htm.
33. State Warns Consumers About 'Senior Specialists', ELDER ABUSE MDT
MINUTES/NEWSL. (Wash. County Sheriff's Office Elder Safe Program, Hillsboro, Or.),
Sept./Oct. 2006, at 1, available at http://www.co.washington.or.us/sheriff/serv-
ice/abusemdt/oct06.pdf.
34. CALIFORNIA SENATE INS. COMM., FINANCIAL PLANNING OR FLEECING OF
SENIORS?: INSURANCE PRODUCTS AND INVESTMENTS 12 (2003), http://www.quat-
loos.com/Cal Ins Committee 27 Feb 2003_FinancialPlanningScams.pdf.
35. AARIP, THE POLICY BOOK: AARP PUBLIC POLICIES 2007, FINANCIAL SERVICES
AND CONSUMER PRODUCTS (2007), http://assets.aarp.org/www.aarp.org_/articles/legp-
olicy/1 lconsu07.pdf.
36. The only title or term currently subject to federal regulation is "investment advi-
sor." "In general, investment advisors who manage $25 million or more in clients' assets
must be registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), while advisors who
manage less than $25 million must register with the state securities agency in the state where
they have their principal place of business." Id. at 11-35.
37. State Warns Consumers About 'Senior Specialists', supra note 33.
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have time to listen; (3) welcome visitors, especially insurance agents; and
(4) tend to be more trusting or deferential to an "expert."38 While insurance
agents do not have a monopoly on coaxing customers into lousy invest-
ments or fraud, a confluence of factors has made insurance agents a prime
medium for engaging elderly clients in these transactions. First, life insur-
ance agents have access to an audience of willing and sometimes desperate
buyers. The elderly are uniquely interested in products that promise in-
creased cognitive function, virility, improved physical condition,39 and fi-
nancial freedom. Second, life insurance agents have intimate knowledge of
their clients' financial conditions and abilities (i.e., the type of assets and
their value). Third, they also have the trust of their clients and are often
trusted members of their communities. Lastly, life insurance agents know
where their clients' money is (i.e., the physical location of the asset).40
"That insurance agents would wittingly or unwittingly be able to draw sen-
iors into fraudulent schemes is not surprising .... 'Con artists love an envi-
ronment of trust ... and insurance agents already have the trust of older
people." 41
II. THE EXTENT OF THE PROBLEM
The exact number of elders who are victims of life insurance swin-
dling is unknown. However, "while only a minority of agents have been
involved in fraudulent schemes, they have been responsible for billions dis-
appearing from people's retirement plans and accounts .... "'
Since 2000, the North American Securities Administrators Associa-
tion-a group of state investment regulators-has published a list of the
Top Ten Scams, Schemes & Scandals.
38. Frolik, supra note 31.
39. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Fraud Target: Senior Citizens,
http://www.fbi.gov/majcases/fraud/seniorsfam.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2007).
40. CR Investigates: Insurance Agent Scams, CONSUMER REPS., Aug. 2004, at 40,
available at http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary_0286-22105443_ITM.
41. Top Ten Investment Scams: Seniors are Favorite Targets as Fraud Moves from
Wall St. to Main Street; http://money.cnn.com/2001/04/23/investing/securitiesfr-
aud/index.htm [hereinafter Top Ten Investment Scams] (quoting Jane King, Manager of
Consumer Protection, American Association of Retired Persons).
42. CR Investigates: Insurance Agent Scams, supra note 40.
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The ranking of scams is listed in order of prevalence and seriousness.
2000 2001 2002 2003
unlicensed unlicensed unlicensed
individuals, individuals, individuals,
interet fraud such as life such as such as
insurance insurance insurance
agents, selling agents, selling agents, selling
securities securities securities
investment affinity group unscrupulous affmity group
seminars fraud stock brokers fraud
affinity group payphones and analyst payphone and
fraud ATM sales research ATM sales
conflict
abusive sales promissory promissory promissory
practices notes notes notes
telemarketing internet fraud prime bank internet fraud
fraud schemes
promissory ponzi schemes viatical ponzi schemes
note fraud settlements
viatical
investment callable CDs affinity fraud callable CDs
scams
entertainment viatical charitable gift viatical
fraud settlements annuities settlements
prime bank oil & gas prime bank
ponzi schemes schemes schemes schemes
illegal investment equipment investment
franchising
offerings seminars
44 leasing45 seminars
46
43. See Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft, LLP, NASAA Issues List of "Top 10 In-
vestment Scams" (1999), http://library.findlaw.com/1999/Jul/1/127304.html (last visited
Nov. 21, 2007).
44. See Top Ten Investment Scams, supra note 41.
45. North American Securities Administrators Ass'n, 'Top 10' Investment Scams
Listed by State Securities Regulators (Sept. 16, 2002), http://hawaiirep-
orter.com/story.aspx?dfd7104b-257a-4d70-8edO-4fd40497a90 (last visited Nov. 21, 2007).
46. Top Ten Investment Scams, http://www.kumc.edu/cao/SeniorPressArti-
cle/GoldenAge/Top_10_LnvestmentScams.htm (on file with author).
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At least two of the perennial scams on the list-promissory note
fraud,5" and unlicensed individuals, such as life insurance agents, selling
securities-have been closely linked to life insurance agents. "While most
independent insurance agents are honest professionals, too many are lured
47. State Securities Regulators Release Top 10 Scams, Schemes & Scandals (Jan.
14, 2004), available at http://www.quatloos.com/top10_scams.htm.
48. NASAA's 2005 Top 10 Threats to Investors (Mar. 24, 2005), available at
http://www.webmoneyguide.com/toptenscams.htm.
49. Everything Blog: Top Ten List of Investment Scams, Schemes and Scandals
(Oct. 1, 2006), http://everyravlik.blogspot.com/2006/1 0/top-ten-list-of-investment-
scams.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2007).
50. Promissory notes are "short-term debt instruments issued by little-known or
sometimes non-existent companies that promise high returns-upwards of 15 percent
monthly-with little or no risk." "These notes are often sold to investors by independent life
insurance agents." Military.com, Law Scams, http://www.military.com/benefits/legal-
matters/law-scams (last visited Nov. 21, 2007). When interest rates are low, investors-
especially seniors-are often lured by the higher, fixed returns that promissory notes offer.
2004 2005 2006
ponzi schemes ponzi schemes ponzi schemes
senior unlicensed senior
investment individuals investment
sellingfraud securities fraud
unregistered promissorypromissory i vestment oisr
notes products notes
unscrupulous promissory unscrupulous
brokers notes brokers
affinity seniorfaudt investment affinity fraudfraudfraud
insurance insurance
agents agents and
and other high-yield other
unlicensed investments unlicensed
securities securities
sellers sellers
prime bank interet fraud prime bank
schemes schemes
Internet affinity fraud internet fraud
fraud
variable mutual fundfud annuity sales business
fraud practices practices
variable
variable oil & gas arite
annuities47  scams
48  annuities
___________L firaud
4 9
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by high commissions into selling... promissory notes, ATM and payphone
investment contracts and viatical settlements."'"
In the first quarter of 2001, eleven of sixteen cease-and-desist orders
issued by the Securities Division of Indiana were directed to insurance
agents who were selling securities without the proper license.52 Most were
independent life insurance agents,53 which tend to represent more than one
company. Many represent only one. In March 2001, "25 states and the
District of Columbia announced actions against companies and individu-
als-many of them independent life insurance agents-that took roughly
4,500 people for $76 million .... In 2002, in an alleged scam sold al-
most entirely by independent insurance agents, investors in at least fourteen
states lost close to $30 million.5 That same year, in Arizona, three inde-
pendent insurance agents scammed investors out of more than $20 million. 6
One of the three scammed elderly investors out of nearly $2 million by first
soliciting them to purchase "living trusts," and then switching them into
annuities, and finally using bogus promissory notes. 7
In June 2002, four Georgia-based scam artists were sentenced to sev-
enteen years in prison for recruiting independent insurance agents to sell
millions of dollars worth of bogus promissory notes. 8 Half of each invest-
ment went to pay commissions that were divided among company princi-
pals and sales agents. 9 Georgia securities regulators were able to seize
nearly $5 million of the $8 million fraudulently taken from local investors.6"
"The average age of the victims was 68.' '6' That same year, a Maine court
sentenced an insurance agent to seven years in prison for operating a prom-
issory note scam that took twenty-five people for more than $1 million.6 2 In
2003, Arizona securities regulators obtained a $4.3 million final judgment
against a Scottsdale company and two insurance agents who fraudulently
sold charitable gift annuities to mostly senior investors.63
The link between life insurance agents and financial elder abuse is be-
yond dispute. "Regulators estimate that promissory note fraud [alone] has
51. State Securities Regulators Release Top 10 Scams, Schemes & Scandals, supra
note 47.
52. Law Scams, supra note 50.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. North American Securities Administrators Ass'n, supra note 45.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. North American Securities Administrators Ass'n, supra note 45.
62. Id.
63. State Securities Regulators Release Top 10 Scams, Schemes & Scandals, supra
note 47.
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cost Americans over $300 million."' Between July 1999 and June 2000,
California regulators took enforcement action against 185 individuals and
45 entities for unlicensed broker-dealer activity and filed two major civil
actions against five entities and nine individuals.65 They also announced the
issuance of a total of 433 orders for the illegal and fraudulent offer and sale
of securities in connection with a national crackdown on sellers of promis-
sory notes pledging high returns and low risks to investors.66 California's
investigation revealed that these promissory notes were often sold by inde-
pendent life insurance agents.67 In 2000, the Attorney General of New
York charged two insurance adjusters in a promissory note fraud scam that
cost their victims $3.8 million.68 Similar investigations throughout the
country also substantiated the link between life insurance agents and finan-
cial elder abuse. 69 Consequently, by 2006, the twenty-eight state task force
formed in 1999 to respond to the growing problem of promissory note
fraud7" had expanded to thirty-eight states.7
III. A LIFE INSURANCE AGENT'S FINANCIAL ELDER ABUSE STORY
At the time of the hearing before the Insurance Commissioner of
Oklahoma, Virginia Marks was a seventy-four-year-old retired school-
teacher with an eighty-one-year-old husband who was also a retired school-
teacher.72 Michael Hentges was a life insurance agent for Columbus Life
Insurance Company and had advised the Markses on their investments, in-
surance, and financial planning for approximately twenty years.73 On Octo-
ber 1, 1999, Hentges sold the Markses' Trust a $410,000 whole life, life
insurance policy through Columbus Life Insurance Company. " On or about
64. Protecting Yourself Against Note Fraud, available at http://www.sav-
ewealth.com/specialreports/notefraud/ (last visited Nov. 21, 2008).
65. California Leads Security Regulators Crackdown on Promissory Note Fraud
(June 1, 2000), http://www.michiganannuity.com/news.cftn/Article/5861/California-Leads-
Securities-Regulators.html.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Press Release, N.Y. State Att'y Gen. Dep't of Law, Spitzer Charges Pair in $3.8
Million Promissory Note Fraud: Ins. Agents Preyed on Clients (June 1, 2000),
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2000/jun/jun01a_00.html [hereinafter Press Release].
69. See California Leads Security Regulators Crackdown on Promissory Note
Fraud, supra note 65; Press Release, supra note 68.
70. See California Leads Security Regulators Crackdown on Promissory Note
Fraud, supra note 65; Press Release, supra note 68.
71. See Protecting Senior Citizens Against Investment Fraud, supra note 8.
72. Order Revoking License of Michael Edmund Hentges 2, State ex rel. Holland
v. Hentges (Ins. Comnm'r of Okla. Oct. 27, 2005) (Nos. 05-0688-DIS, 05-1164-DIS).
73. Verified Pet. 13, Marks v. Hentges (Okla. Dist. Ct. July 1, 2005) (No. CJ-
2005-03882).
74. Id. 16.
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September 9, 2003, Hentges contacted Mrs. Marks seeking to borrow
$25,000. When asked why he thought she would have the money to make
such a loan, Hentges referred Mrs. Marks to the $200,000 she had in the
Columbus Life Insurance policy. He also counseled her on the possibility
of cashing in certificates of deposits that the Markses owned. Mrs. Marks
ultimately borrowed the requested funds from the Columbus Life policy and
transferred the funds to Hentges in a check made payable to 76PW, LLC,
whose asset was an airplane. To induce Mrs. Marks to make the loan,
Hentges promised to repay the money in three months at five percent inter-
est per month.75 This promise was memorialized in a promissory note given
to Mrs. Marks. According to Hentges, the purpose of the loan was to repair
the airplane owned by 76PW, LLC. Although the loan was for three
months, no payment was made to Mrs. Marks until January 2005.76
Approximately one week later, Hentges returned to Mrs. Marks seek-
ing to borrow an additional $50,000 at an interest rate of two percent per
month on behalf of his real estate company. This loan was also facilitated
with funds borrowed by Mrs. Marks from the Columbus Life Insurance
policy sold to her by Hentges. In return for the loan, Hentges provided Mrs.
Marks with a promissory note from Real Estate Marketing Services, LLC
(REM). The promissory note promised "to pay Virginia Marks the princi-
pal sum of Fifty Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($50,000.00), together with
interest thereon at the rate Five Percent (5%) per month .... []due and pay-
able on December 15, 3003 [sic]."77
In November 2003, Hentges again approached Mrs. Marks for a loan
in the amount of $25,000 for investment in a real estate company. He ad-
vised the Markses that it would be prudent to borrow the money from the
Columbus Life Insurance policy that he had sold them. When Mrs. Marks
received the money from Columbus Life and delivered it to Hentges, he
presented a third promissory note stating "[t]he entire unpaid principal and
accrued interest thereon shall be due and payable on February 18, 2004." 78
In January 2004, Hentges approached Mrs. Marks and requested a $100,000
loan for investment in his real estate company. As with the prior three
loans, Hentges prepared the Columbus Life Insurance "Request for Surren-
der/Withdrawal Transfer/Loan" paperwork and presented it to the Markses
for their signature. He also provided the Markses with an updated copy of
the letter requesting that Columbus Life "use this as my authorization to
take a loan from my above listed policy in the amount of $100,000.00....
75. Id. Ex. A, 19-20 ("with the entire unpaid principal and accrued interest
thereon shall be due and payable on December 8, 3003[sic])." Promissory notes are short-
term debt instruments that promise high returns with little or no risks.
76. Order Revoking License of Michael Edmund Hentges, supra note 72, 1 2-3.
77. Verified Pet., supra note 73, Ex. B, 9-14.
78. Id. Ex. C, 77 19-20.
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If you have any questions, please contact my agent, Michael E. Hentges."79
A similar letter listing the respective amount had been prepared by Hentges
and presented to Columbus Life, along with each loan request. In conjunc-
tion with the $100,000 loan, Hentges provided Mrs. Marks with a promis-
sory note promising to:
pay to Leslie D. Marks and Virginia D. Marks, husband and wife, as joint tenants
with rights of survivorship, or order the principal sum of One Hundred Thousand
and No/100 Dollars ($100,000.00), together with interest thereon at the rate of
Eight Percent (8%) per annum until all principal and interest due and owing are
paid. °
Hentges, at the time of the filing of the civil suit, had repaid a com-
bined sum of $54,000 on the principal and interest on all of the notes."' A
combined principal and accrued interest in the aggregate sum of
$204,166.70 remained due and owing. 2
According to the hearing examiner, Mr. Hentges "used his relationship
as the insurance agent and financial advisor to induce Mrs. Marks to make
the above loans: 83
In his dealing with Mrs. Marks, Respondent [Hentges] was dishonest in his prom-
ises of repayments of loans and in the transfer of those funds from one business to
another which he either owned or had a financial interest. As her insurance agent
and financial advisor, he breached his fiduciary relationship to the detriment of
Mrs. Marks and to his benefit and that of his business ventures.
8 4
In a companion case before the Oklahoma Insurance Commission,
Michael Hentges was also found guilty of inducing Janice Marie Kelly, a
sixty-five-year-old retired schoolteacher, into making a $200,000 invest-
ment to purchase a twenty-five percent interest in 76PW, LLC.85 According
to the terms of the investment, Ms. Kelly was to recover the amount of the
investment in two years at ten percent interest.8 6 Default occurred in June
2003 on the date of the first payment. Ms. Kelly received no return on her
money until early 2005 when she received $6,700. In conclusion, the hear-
ing examiner found that
6. The evidence clearly showed Respondent's [Hentges] untrustworthiness and
incompetence in using information he had about the financial affairs of Mrs. Marks
and Ms. Kelly to borrow money for ventures in which he had a substantial interest
and for his benefit and his failure to repay and by defaulting on the first payment
dates.
79. Id. 9 21-23.
80. Id. Ex. D, IT 28-30.
81. Id. 932.
82. Id.
83. Order Revoking License of Michael Edmund Hentges, supra note 72, 5.
84. Id. 8.
85. Id. 9.
86. Id.
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7. All evidence taken together in this case shows a person who used his connec-
tions and persuasive powers to take the savings of two ladies in their retirement
years for his personal benefit or that of his entities .... 87
The preceding financial elder abuse story is all too common in many
respects. However, Hentges's response to the demand letter prepared by
Mrs. Marks's attorney sheds additional light on another recurrent prob-
lem-restoring the victim to her pre-fraud status-associated with financial
elder abuse by insurance agents. As written by Mr. Hentges's attorney:
After reviewing the Leslie & Virginia Marks promissory notes and your letter of
June 22, 2005, I told my client that I would not use my skills as an attorney to de-
fend him in this matter... that I would represent him only in an effort to get these
debts paid. With that in mind, I would like to think that we are on the same side in
this case.
Before we can make any progress, however, there are several absolute "truths" that
you and your clients must accept. They are as follows:
1. Mr. Hentges is financially unable to make payment at this time;
2. If he looses [sic] his license to sell insurance, his future ability to pay will be
severely hampered;
3. He will not pay the usurious and other high interest rates called for in the notes;
4. He will not make a partial payment on a past due note; and
5. He will not pay if he gets sued.
I realize that these absolute "truths" are objectionable, but you must accept them as
a predicate to any further negotiations. If you do not, the Marks [sic] will never get
paid. Most certainly, I do not intend this as a threat. I know my client. These
"truths" are simply the way it is and nothing I can say or do will change them.
Assuming that you will accept the foregoing, in settlement and compromise of
these promissory note obligations, I propose the following:
1. The loans be recalculated with interest at the rate of 8% per annum and we ar-
rive upon an agreed "sum certain" due and owing;
2. The Marks [sic] acknowledge the four notes as paid in full and surrender the
originals; and
3. Mr. Hentges execute and deliver a new installment note for the "sum certain"
with 6% interest thereon, payable in twelve quarterly payments (preferably by elec-
tronic transfer).
I anticipate your initial reaction to be negative, but please.., do not summarily re-
ject this proposal. I have given it a great deal of thought and I believe that it is the
only viable solution. At the very least, please call me and give me an opportunity
to explain my reasoning in more detail.
Very truly yours,
87. Id. 6-7.
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This response letter is significant for a number of reasons. Most sig-
nificant, however, is the fact that the abuser asserts his precarious financial
position-inability to pay-as a shield. In keeping with the art of fraud, the
abuser uses the fact that he could possibly lose his sole source of income-
selling insurance-as leverage for not being sued and a new deal, the terms
of which he negotiates. The totality of the circumstances raises the question
of corporate accountability for financial elder abuse perpetuated by insur-
ance agents.
IV. THE LEGAL BASIS FOR HOLDING A COMPANY LIABLE FOR
AN AGENT'S TORT
The legal basis supporting imposition of tort liability on an employer
for the acts committed by others has been classified into four distinct cate-
gories. Accordingly, section 219 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency
provides:
(1) A master is subject to liability for the torts of his servants committed while act-
ing in the scope of their employment.
(2) A master is not subject to liability for the torts of his servants acting outside the
scope of their employment, unless:
(a) the master intended the conduct or the consequences, or
(b) the master was negligent or reckless, or
(c) the conduct violated a non-delegable duty of the master, or
(d) the servant purported to act or to speak on behalf of the principal and there
was reliance upon apparent authority, or he was aided in accomplishing the tort
by the existence of the agency relation.
89
The theories of liability recognized in section 219 are commonly re-
ferred to as (1) respondeat superior;9" (2) direct liability of the employer;9'
(3) liability for a non-delegable duty;92 and (4) apparent agency.93
A. Respondeat Superior
Respondeat superior is the most common example of vicarious liabil-
ity. Pursuant to this doctrine, the culpability of a servant or employee is
imputed to the nonculpable master or employer if the former was acting
within the scope of his or her employment with the latter at the time of the
88. Verified Pet., supra note 73, Ex. F, 35.
89. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1958).
90. Id. § 219(1).
91. Id. § 219(2)(a)-(b).
92. Id. § 219(2)(c).
93. Id. § 219(2)(d).
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tortious act.94 A variety of rationales have been advanced in explanation of
respondeat superior.95  However, two theories-"control" and "enterprise
liability"-have been accorded the greatest weight in contemporary legal
thought.96 Pursuant to the control theory, liability may be imposed on the
employer whenever the act of the employee was committed with the implied
authority, acquiescence, or subsequent ratification of the employer.97 Ac-
cording to the enterprise theory, respondeat superior is limited to requiring
an enterprise to bear the loss incurred as a result of an employee's negli-
gence. The act of the employee, however, must be so connected to his em-
ployment as to justify the imposition of liability on the employer.98 The
enterprise theory presupposes that an employer's enterprise creates inevita-
ble risks as a part of doing business and that the employer is liable for risks
that are inherent in or created by the enterprise.9 9
94. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 501-02
(W. Page Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984). While respondeat superior is universally expressed in
terms of the employer being held liable for an employee's negligence committed within the
scope of employment, the doctrine has broader application and imputes liability on an em-
ployer for any torts committed by an employee within the scope of employment. See, e.g.,
Ala. Power Co. v. Bodine, 105 So. 869 (Ala. 1925) (doctrine applicable to intentional tort);
Taranto v. N. Slope Borough, 909 P.2d 354 (Alaska 1996) (applicable to intentional tort);
Perez v. Van Groningen & Sons, Inc., 719 P.2d 676 (Cal. 1986) (doctrine applicable to inten-
tional tort); Colo. Comp. Ins. Auth. v. Jones, 131 P.3d 1074 (Colo. Ct. App. 2005) (doctrine
applicable to intentional torts); Mullen v. Horton, 700 A.2d 1377 (Conn. App. Ct. 1997)
(doctrine applicable to willful tort); Howard v. J.H. Harvey Co., 521 S.E.2d 691 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1999) (doctrine applicable to intentional tort); Stropes v. Heritage House Childrens Ctr.
of Shelbyville, Inc., 547 N.E.2d 244 (Ind. 1989) (doctrine applicable to criminal conduct);
Williams v. Cmty. Drive-In Theater, Inc., 520 P.2d 1296 (Kan. 1974) (doctrine applicable to
intentional tort); Patterson v. Blair, 172 S.W.3d 361 (Ky. 2005) (doctrine applicable to inten-
tional and criminal acts); Kornec v. Mike Horse Mining & Milling Co., 180 P.2d 252 (Mont.
1947) (doctrine applicable to intentional and malicious conduct); Medlin v. Bass, 398 S.E.2d
460 (N.C. 1990) (doctrine applies to intentional tort); Los Ranchitos v. Tierra Grande, Inc.,
861 P.2d 263 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993) (doctrine applicable to intentional and criminal conduct);
Drake v. Star Mkt. Co., 526 A.2d 517 (R.I. 1987) (doctrine applies to intentional tort).
95. See, e.g., John H. Wigmore, Responsibility for Tortious Acts: Its History, 7
HARV. L. REv. 315, 383, 441 (1894); T. BATY, VIcARIOUs LIABILITY 146-54 (1916); Fleming
James, Jr., Vicarious Liability, 28 TuL. L. REv. 161 (1954).
96. KEETON ET AL., supra note 94, at 500-01.
97. Fruit v. Schreiner, 502 P.2d 133, 140 (Alaska 1972).
98. See Beard v. Brown, 616 P.2d 726, 737 (Wyo. 1980).
99. See Fruit, 502 P.2d 133; Inter Mountain Mortgage, Inc. v. Sulimen, 93 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 790 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000); Sheftic v. Marecki, No. 56764, 1999 Conn. Super. LEXIS
2953 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 21, 1999); Carroll Air Sys. v. Greenbaum, 629 So. 2d 914 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1993); Henderson v. Prof I Coatings Corp., 819 P.2d 84 (Haw. 1991); Shelby
v. Truck & Bus Group Div. of Gen. Motors Corp., 533 N.E.2d 1296 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989);
Riniker v. Wilson, 623 N.W.2d 220 (Iowa Ct. App. 2000); Brillhart v. Scheier, 758 P.2d 219
(Kan. 1988); Richardson v. APAC-Miss., 631 So. 2d 143 (Miss. 1994); Carter v. Reynolds,
815 A.2d 460 (N.J. 2003).
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The general rule of vicarious liability is beyond dispute. However, vi-
carious liability has been applied to so many exceptional circumstances that
"the rule is now primarily important as a preamble to the catalog of its ex-
ceptions."'' 0 Therefore, "[w]hat has emerged as the modem justification for
vicarious liability is a rule of policy, a deliberate allocation of risk."''
Thus, respondeat superior is an expression of the sentiment that it would be
unjust to permit an employer to gain from the efforts of others without being
responsible for the mistakes, errors of judgment, and frailties of those work-
ing for his benefit. As such, respondeat superior provides an incentive to
monitor employees and deter wrongful conduct.' 2
Two distinct requirements must be met to establish the liability of an
employer for the tortious act of an employee. First, it must be demonstrated
that the requisite master/servant, employer/employee, or principal/agent
relationship existed at the time of the tortious act.0 3 This requirement is
concerned exclusively with the nature of the relationship between the actor
and the person being charged with responsibility for the consequences of the
act. If the requisite relationship does not exist, no further inquiry is neces-
sary and respondeat superior may not be invoked. Where the requisite rela-
tionship is proven to exist, however, the second requirement-that the tor-
tious act took place within the scope of employment-must be satisfied."°
The test used in the vast majority of jurisdictions for determining
whether the relational requirement, i.e., employer/employee, for application
of respondeat superior has been satisfied is that articulated in Restatement
(Second) of Agency section 220. According to section 220:
(1) A servant is a person employed to perform services in the affairs of another and
who with respect to the physical conduct in the performance of the services is sub-
ject to the other's control or right to control.
(2) In determining whether one acting for another is a servant or an independent
contractor, the following matters of fact, among others, are considered:
100. Pac. Fire Ins. Co. v. Kenny Boiler & Mfg. Co., 277 N.W. 226, 228 (Minn.
1937).
101. KEETON ET AL., supra note 94, at 500 (citation omitted).
102. Brady v. Dairy Fresh Prods. Co., 974 F.2d 1149, 1151 (9th Cir. 1992).
103. Chamlee v. Johnson-Rast & Hays, 579 So. 2d 580 (Ala. 1990); Estate of Himsel
v. State, 36 P.3d 35 (Alaska 2001); State v. Superior Court, 524 P.2d 951 (Ariz. 1974) (en
banc); Lefebvre v. Delmar Appliance of Del., Inc., No. 98C-01-026(WLW), 2001 Del. Su-
per. LEXIS 122 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 23, 2001); Murphy v. Army Distaff Found., Inc., 458
A.2d 61 (D.C. 1983); Torres v. Tandy Corp., 592 S.E.2d 111 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003); Godar v.
Edwards, 588 N.W.2d 701 (Iowa 1999); Doe v. Roman Catholic Church, 615 So. 2d 410 (La.
Ct. App. 1993); Rockwell v. Sun Harbor Budget Suites, 925 P.2d 1175 (Nev. 1996); Jordan
v. Cates, 935 P.2d 289 (Okla. 1997).
104. Chamlee, 579 So. 2d 580; Estate of Himsel, 36 P.3d 35; Superior Court, 524
P.2d 951; Lefebvre, 2001 Del. Super. LEXIS 122; Murphy, 458 A.2d 61; Torres, 592 S.E.2d
111; Godar, 588 N.W.2d 701; Doe, 615 So. 2d 410; Rockwell, 925 P.2d 1175; Jordan, 935
P.2d 289.
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(a) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may exercise over
the details of the work;
(b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or
business;
(c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality, the work
is usually done under the direction of the employer or by a specialist without
supervision;
(d) the skill required in the particular occupation;
(e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the instrumentalities, tools,
and the place of work for the person doing the work;
(f) the length of time for which the person is employed;
(g) the method of payment; whether by the time or by the job;
(h) whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the employer;
(i) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relation of master
and servant; and
(j) whether the principal is or is not in business.10 5
105. Section 220 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency is used in forty-two states
and in the District of Columbia to determine whether the requisite relationship exists. See
Powell v. Tanner, 59 P.3d 246 (Alaska 2002); Ringling Bros. & Barnum Bailey Combined
Shows, Inc. v. Superior Court, 680 P.2d 174 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983); Blankenship v. Overholt,
786 S.W.2d 814 (Ark. 1990); Grant v. Woods, 139 Cal. Rptr. 533 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977);
Norton v. Gilman, 949 P.2d 565 (Colo. 1997); Hanson v. Transp. Gen., Inc., 716 A.2d 857
(Conn. 1998); Falconi v. Coombs & Coombs, Inc., 902 A.2d 1094 (Del. 2006); Sturdivant v.
Seaboard Serv. Sys., Ltd., 459 A.2d 1058 (D.C. 1983); Harper v. Toler, 884 So. 2d 1124
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004); Atlanta Commercial Builders, Inc. v. Polinsky, 250 S.E.2d 781
(Ga. Ct. App. 1978); Bailey's Bakery, Ltd. v. Borthwick, No. 2639, 1948 Haw. LEXIS 34
(Haw. Feb. 14, 1948); Van Vranken v. Fence-Craft, 430 P.2d 488 (Idaho 1967); Buccieri v.
I11. Cent. Gulf R.R., 601 N.E.2d 840 (I11. App. Ct. 1992); Carter v. Prop. Owners Ins. Co.,
846 N.E.2d 712 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006); Burr v. Apex Concrete Co., 242 N.W.2d 272 (Iowa
1976); Brillhart v. Scheier, 758 P.2d 219 (Kan. 1988); Knorp v. Albert, 28 P.3d 1024 (Kan.
Ct. App. 2001); Ky. Unemployment Ins. Comm'n v. Landmark Cmty. Newspapers of Ky.,
Inc., 91 S.W.3d 575 (Ky. 2002); Kennedy v. Pine Tree Council & Boy Scouts of Am., No.
CV-91-752, 1995 Me. Super. LEXIS 216 (Me. Super. Ct. June 14, 1995); Bait. Harbor Char-
ters, Ltd. v. Ayd, 780 A.2d 303 (Md. 2001); Salmon v. Anthony Mfg. Co., No. 97-05182E,
1998 Mass. Super. LEXIS 582 (Mass. Super. Ct. Nov. 5, 1998); Bergman v. Cleveland Cliffs
Iron Co., 425 N.W.2d 97 (Mich. 1988); Lindberry v. J.A. Danens & Son, Inc., 123 N.W.2d
695 (Minn. 1963); Richardson v. APAC-Miss., Inc., 631 So. 2d 143 (Miss. 1994); Griffin v.
Sinks Ford Sales, 413 S.W.2d 856 (Mo. Ct. App. 1967); Watts v. Mont. Rail Link, Inc., 975
P.2d 283 (Mont. 1997); Sandrock v. Taylor, 174 N.W.2d 186 (Neb. 1970); Boissonnault v.
Bristol Federated Church, 642 A.2d 328 (N.H. 1994); Carter v. Reynolds, 815 A.2d 460 (N.J.
2003); Benavidez v. Sierra Blanca Motors, 959 P.2d 569 (N.M. Ct. App. 1998); Cook v.
Morrison, 413 S.E.2d 922 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992); Blackstone v. Daugherty, No. OT-78-22,
1979 Ohio App. LEXIS 9400 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 23, 1979); Kowaleski v. Kowaleski, 385
P.2d 611 (Or. 1963); Commonwealth v. Roberts, 141 A.2d 393 (Pa. 1958); Estate of Perry v.
Green Card, Inc., No. PC/03-4671, 2006 R.I. Super. LEXIS 170 (R.I. Super. Ct. Nov. 30,
2006); Jeitz v. Fleming, 217 N.W.2d 868 (S.D. 1974); Ascolese v. Misco, Inc., No. 88-283-
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Whether the requisite relationship exists ultimately depends on the
facts of the specific case. The presence of any one of the relevant consid-
erations alone is not dispositive.'0 6 Neither is the presence of all of the fac-
tors required in order to make the determination. The relevant considera-
tions are merely considered along with all of the other circumstances rele-
vant to the issue of whether, in fact, the employer retained a degree of con-
trol sufficient to support a finding that a master/servant relationship existed
at the time of the tortious act."7 Approximately eight jurisdictions continue
to rely on the common law concept of control as dispositive of whether the
requisite relationship existed at the time of the tortious act.'08
Scope of employment operates as a limitation on the relational aspect
of respondeat superior. In other words, the employer's liability exposure
extends no further than the torts committed by the employee while acting in
the scope of his or her employment.0 9 Despite its simplicity, scope of em-
ployment is a very vague and nebulous concept. As a term of art:
[t]his highly indefinite phrase ... is so devoid of meaning in itself that its very
vagueness has been of value in permitting a desirable degree of flexibility in deci-
sions. It is obviously no more than a bare formula to cover the unordered and un-
authorized acts of the servant for which it is found to be expedient to charge the
master with liability, as well as to exclude other acts for which it is not.'
10
Accordingly, the Restatement (Second) of Agency section 228 recog-
nizes a number of factors that should be considered in resolving the ques-
tion. According to section 228:
(1) Conduct of a servant is within the scope of employment if, but only if:
II, 1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS 236 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 22, 1989); Atchison, Topeka & Santa
Fe Ry. Co. v. Port of Beaumont Navigation Dist. of Jefferson County, Tex., 438 S.W.2d 843
(Tex. App. 1969); Glover v. Boy Scouts of Am., 923 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1996); Clements v.
MCV Associated Physicians, 61 Va. Cir. 673 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2002); RLI Ins. Co. v. Vt. Agency
of Transp., 762 A.2d 475 (Vt. 2000); Hollingbery v. Dunn, 411 P.2d 431 (Wash. 1966);
Meka v. Falk Corp., 306 N.W.2d 65 (Wis. 1981).
106. Anderson v. PPCT Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 145 P.3d 503, 507-08 (Alaska 2006);
Carter v. Wright, 949 S.W.2d 157, 160 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
107. Brock v. Difani, No. CA98-351, 1999 Ark. App. LEXIS 37, at *8 (Ark. Ct. App.
Jan. 20, 1999).
108. Literal control is not required. Rather, the inquiry centers around whether the
employer had the right to control the method, manner, or operative details of work. Terry v.
Phillips 66 Co., 591 So. 2d 33 (Ala. 1991); Cupit v. Grant, 488 So. 2d 358 (La. Ct. App.
1986); Nat'l Convenience Stores v. Fantauzzi, 584 P.2d 689 (Nev. 1978); Berger v. Dykstra,
610 N.Y.S.2d 401 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999); Doan v. City of Bismarck, 632 N.W.2d 815 (N.D.
2001); Anderson v. West, 241 S.E.2d 551 (S.C. 1978); Zirkle v. Winkler, 585 S.E.2d 19 (W.
Va. 2003); Combined Ins. Co. v. Sinclair, 584 P.2d 1034 (Wyo. 1978).
109. Patterson v. Blair, 172 S.W.3d 361 (Ky. 2005); Fruit v. Schreiner, 502 P.2d 133
(Alaska 1972); Robarge v. Bechtel Power Corp., 640 P.2d 211 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982); Jones
v. Blair, 387 N.W.2d 349 (Iowa 1986).
110. KEETON ET AL., supra note 94, at 502.
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(a) it is of the kind he is employed to perform;
(b) it occurs substantially within the authorized time and space limits;
(c) it is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the master, and
(d) if force is intentionally used by the servant against another, the use of force
is not unexpected by the master.
(2) Conduct of a servant is not within the scope of employment if it is different in
kind from that authorized, far beyond the authorized time or space limits, or too lit-
tle actuated by a purpose to serve the master.11
While the essential considerations for drawing the ultimate conclusion
are stated in section 228, additional factors are stated in section 229.112 A
few jurisdictions, however, treat the section 229 factors as dispositive of
111. Section 228 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency is used in thirty-one states
and in the District of Columbia to determine whether the requisite relationship exists. See
Luth v. Rogers & Babler Constr. Co., 507 P.2d 761 (Alaska 1973); Olson v. Staggs-Bilt
Homes, Inc., 534 P.2d 1073 (Ariz. 1975); Duperry v. Rodrigues, No. CV010278771S, 2004
Conn. Super. LEXIS 1202 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 5, 2004); Coates v. Murphy, 270 A.2d
527 (Del. 1970); District of Columbia v. Coron, 515 A.2d 435 (D.C. 1986); Powers v. E.R.
Precision Optical Corp., 886 So. 2d 281 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004); Wong-Leong v. Haw.
Indep. Refinery, Inc. 879 P.2d 538 (Haw. 1994); Wooley v. Debest Plumbing, Inc., 983 P.2d
864 (Idaho 1999); Bagent v. Blessing Care Corp., 862 N.E.2d 985 (I11. 2007); Celebration
Fireworks, Inc. v. Smith, 727 N.E.2d 450 (Ind. 2000); LeBrane v. Lewis, 292 So. 2d 216 (La.
1974); Spencer v. V.I.P., Inc., 910 A.2d 366 (Me. 2006); Tall v. Bd. of School Comm'rs, 706
A.2d 659 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1998); Kansallis v. Fern, 659 N.E.2d 731 (Mass. 1996); Kas-
ner v. Gage, 161 N.W.2d 40 (Minn. 1968); Jones v. B.L. Dev. Corp., 940 So. 2d 961 (Miss.
Ct. App. 2006); Noah v. Ziehl, 759 S.W.2d 905 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988); Maguire v. State, 835
P.2d 755 (Mont. 1992); Johnson v. Evers, 238 N.W.2d 474 (Neb. 1976); Pierson v. Hubbard,
802 A.2d 1162 (N.H. 2002); Carter v. Reynolds, 815 A.2d 460, 464 (N.J. 2003); Los Ranchi-
tos v. Tierra Grande, Inc., 861 P.2d 263 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993); Dinkins v. Farley, 434
N.Y.S.2d 325 (1980). But see Ramos v. Jake Realty Co., 801 N.Y.S.2d 566 (N.Y. App. Div.
2006); Nelson v. Gillette, 571 N.W.2d 332 (N.D. 1997); Hale v. Spitzer Dodge Inc., No.
04AP-1379, 2006 Ohio App. LEXIS 3246 (Ohio Ct. App. June 29, 2006); Ferrell v. Martin,
419 A.2d 152 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980); Alberts v. Mutual Serv. Cas. Ins. Co., 123 N.W.2d 96
(S.D. 1963); Morris v. Collis Foods, Inc., No. W2001-00918-COA-R3-CV, 2002 Tenn. App.
LEXIS 441 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 19, 2002); Brueckner v. Norwich Univ., 730 A.2d 1086
(Vt. 1999); Tremel v. Reid, 45 Va. Cir. 364 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1998); Robel v. Roundup Corp., 59
P.3d 611 (Wash. 2002); Finsland v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 204 N.W.2d 1 (Wis. 1973).
112. See Luth, 507 P.2d at 764; Ortiz v. Clinton, 928 P.2d 718 (Ariz. 1996); State v.
Hoshijo, 76 P.3d 550 (Haw. 2003); Celebration Fireworks, 727 N.E.2d at 453; LeBrane, 292
So. 2d at 218-19; Erving v. Inhabitants of Wellington, No. CV-92-040, 1994 Me. Super.
LEXIS 66 (Me. Super. Ct. Feb. 25, 1994); Tall, 706 A.2d at 668; Kasner, 161 N.W.2d at 42;
Noah, 759 S.W.2d at 910-11; House v. Kalispell Reg'l Med. Ctr., No. DV-01-426(B), 2002
Mont. Dist. LEXIS 3387 (Mont. Dist. Ct. Oct. 21, 2002); Daigle v. City of Portsmouth, 534
A.2d 689 (N.H. 1987); Carter, 815 A.2d at 464; Ramos, 801 N.Y.S.2d at 567 (test for scope
of employment); Keck v. Masters, No. C-950037, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 5188 (Ohio Ct.
App. Nov. 29, 1995); Alberts, 123 N.W.2d at 98; Morris, 2002 Tenn. App. LEXIS 441 at *9;
Brueckner, 730 A.2d at 1091; Sanders v. Day, 468 P.2d 452 (Wash. Ct. App. 1970); Goode
v. Combined Ins. Co., 308 N.W.2d 777 (Wis. Ct. App. 1981).
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whether the employee was acting within the scope of employment." 3 Nev-
ertheless, the section 229 factors "have primary reference to the physical
activities of servants.""' 4 Consequently, they are not designed to deal with
the special problems of determining whether an intentional tort, such as
fraud, is so similar or incidental to the conduct authorized as to be within
the scope of employment."5
It is universally recognized that the doctrine of respondeat superior is
applicable to situations involving intentional or criminal activities, if they
are committed within the scope of employment." 6 The flexibility of the
phrase "scope of employment" is especially noteworthy in the context of
fraud cases involving agents of corporations. For example, the Alabama
Supreme Court has consistently observed:
that a corporation is liable for the torts of its employees, both agent and servant,
based upon the principle of respondeat superior, not the doctrine of agency. "The
factual question to be determined is whether the act complained of was done either
by agent or servant while acting within the course and scope of his employment;
the corporation or principle may be liable in tort for acts of its servants or agents
done within the scope of employment, real or apparent, even though it did not au-
thorize or ratify such acts or even expressly forbade them." The courts have fur-
ther held the principle liable for his agent's fraud committed within the actual or
apparent scope of his employment, even where the fraud was committed strictly for
the agent's own benefit and to the principal's detriment. "
7
Even in the absence of a specific rule of law, determining scope of em-
ployment from a more traditional legal perspective entails a degree of flexi-
bility sufficient to encompass financial elder abuse. For example, in Baker
v. Stewart Title & Trust of Phoenix, Inc.,' an attorney, Friedman, solicited
about eighty investors to invest in a number of limited partnerships. With
the participation of a real estate broker, accountants, and title companies,
113. See, e.g., Riniker v. Wilson, 623 N.W.2d 220 (Iowa Ct. App. 2000); Bryant v.
Brannen, 446 N.W.2d 847 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989); Dart v. Yellow Cab, Inc., 401 S.W.2d 874
(Tex. App. 1966).
114. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 229 cmt. a (1958).
115. See Charles Davant IV, Employer Liability for Employee Fraud: Apparent Au-
thority or Respondeat Superior?, 47 S.D. L. REv. 554 (2002).
116. See Condict v. Condict, 664 P.2d 131 (Wyo. 1981); Stevenson v. Precision
Standard Inc., 762 So. 2d 820 (Ala. 1999); Taranto v. N. Slope Borough, 909 P.2d 354
(Alaska 1996); Patterson v. Blair, 172 S.W.3d 361 (Ky. 2005); Brown v. King, 767 N.E.2d
357 (Iil. App. Ct. 2001); Cazenave v. Pierce, 568 So. 2d 1360 (La. Ct. App. 1990); Los
Ranchitos, 861 P.2d at 267; Thompson v. Everett Clinic, 860 P.2d 1054 (Wash. Ct. App.
1993). See also the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 231, which provides: "An act
may be within the scope of employment although consciously criminal or tortious."
117. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 553 So. 2d 537, 541 (Ala. 1990) (citation
omitted). See also Land & Assocs., Inc. v. Simmons, 562 So. 2d 140 (Ala. 1989) (limiting
the rule of vicarious liability to soliciting insurance agents; an insurance company is directly
liable for the fraud committed by a general agent).
118. 5 P.3d 249 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000).
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Friedman defrauded the investors by purchasing the land under a fake name
and then reselling it to the limited partnership at an inflated price. DeAngio,
an employee of defendant Stewart Title Company, processed at least eight
escrows that Friedman established in the name of the fictitious buyers or
shell companies. According to the evidence, DeAngio knowingly partici-
pated in at least two transactions that facilitated Friedman's scheme and
shared in the undisclosed profits and fees. In determining whether DeAngio
was acting within the scope of her employment, the court recognized that
conduct falls within said scope if it is the kind the employee is employed to
perform, it occurs within the authorized time and space limits, and it fur-
thers the employer's business, even if the employer has expressly forbidden
it. 119
According to the Baker Court, DeAngio's action fell within the scope
of her employment because she typically notarized documents and opened
and closed escrows. Her tortious actions involved notarizing documents for
Friedman that she knew he had signed under fictitious names and then con-
cealing his fraudulent signature. In the context of analyzing whether the
employee's conduct furthered the employer's business, Stewart Title Com-
pany contended that the escrow fees, collection accounts fees, and title in-
surance fees it was paid would have been received even if DeAngio had
acted legitimately, and that the increase in purchase prices of properties that
resulted from her malfeasance did not affect the fees to which Stewart Title
Company was entitled. 2° The court, however, concluded that:
DeAngio's activity benefitted and furthered the business of Stewart Title because
of the repeat business that she generated with Friedman. In fact, DeAngio stated
that Stewart Title encouraged its escrow officers to procure new clients and de-
velop business with existing clients. These clients would usually follow the es-
crow officers when they changed employment. Generating such benefits may suf-
fice for liability.
121
According to the court, providing incidental and gratuitous services to
customers could improve customer relations and further the company's pur-
pose. 122
Another analytical perspective for assessing the merits of the scope of
employment requirement in the area of financial elder abuse can be gleaned
from the California Court of Appeal's decision in Inter Mountain Mortgage,
Inc. v. Sulimen 23 In Inter Mountain Mortgage, the trial court granted a
motion for summary judgment in favor of the defendant/employer on the
issue of the applicability of respondeat superior. The action arose out of an
119. Id. at 254.
120. Id. at 255.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 790 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000).
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alleged fraudulent loan transaction scheme perpetrated by one of defen-
dant's loan representatives against Inter Mountain Mortgage, the mortgage
loan brokerage that processed the loan.
According to the Court of Appeals in Inter Mountain Mortgage:
"an employee's willful, malicious and even criminal torts may fall within the scope
of his or her employment for purposes of respondeat superior, even though the em-
ployer has not authorized the employee to commit crimes or intentional torts."
"The employer is liable not because the employer has control over the employee or
is in-some way at fault, but because the employer's enterprise creates inevitable
risks as a part of doing business. Under this theory, an employer is liable for 'the
risks inherent in or created by the enterprise."124
Pursuant to this perspective, in order for conduct to be within the
scope of employment, a nexus between the employee's tort and the em-
ployment must exist. '25 This nexus-that the tort be engendered by or arise
from the work-is different from "but for" causation.'26 The fact that the
employment brought the tortfeasor and victim together in time and space is
insufficient evidence for the required nexus. Rather, the proof must demon-
strate that the incident leading to the injury was an outgrowth of the em-
ployment. Thus, "the risk of tortious injury must be 'inherent in the work-
ing environment' or 'typical of or broadly incidental to the enterprise [the
employer] has undertaken."" 27  Accordingly, courts should examine the
employee's conduct as a whole, rather than merely focusing on the wrong-
ful act itself. The pertinent inquiry is whether the injury-causing act was
one in a series of acts authorized by the employer so that the job-created
authority facilitated the commission of the tort.
"The employee's tortious conduct must also be 'a generally foresee-
able consequence of the activity."" 28  Foreseeability means that the em-
ployee's conduct, in the context of the particular enterprise, is not so un-
usual or startling that it would be unjust to include the loss resulting from it
among other costs of doing business.'29
According to the evidence in Inter Mountain Mortgage, the alleged
fraudulent transaction occurred during the employee's employment with the
defendant as a loan representative. The employee also represented that he
was submitting the loan to Inter Mountain as a part of his job responsibili-
ties. As noted by the appellate court in reversing the grant of summary
judgment in favor of the employer:
124. Id. at 794 (citations omitted).
125. Id. at 795.
126. Id
127. Id. at 795 (citations omitted).
128. Inter Mountain Mortgage, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 795.
129. Id
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Under such circumstances, a nexus existed between Baskaron's [employee] alleged
tort, the fraudulent loan transaction, and his employment as a loan representative.
The risk of one of defendants' loan representatives submitting a fraudulent loan
application, such as the Brown loan application, was a generally foreseeable risk
inherent and incidental to defendants' mortgage loan brokerage business.
Baskaron's employment as a loan representative placed him in the position of be-
ing able to submit fraudulent loan applications. Such an occurrence was "not so
unusual or startling that it would seem unfair to include the loss resulting from it
among other costs of the employer's business.'
130
The practical effect of each perspective is its recognition of the impor-
tant role of the jury in determining the scope of employment in fraud
cases.13 ' Each perspective also demonstrates the significance of public pol-
icy in respondeat superior analysis. The relevant public policy considera-
tions include: (1) whether application of the doctrine of respondeat superior
will have a preventive or deterrent effect; (2) whether application of the
doctrine will provide greater assurance of compensation to victims; and (3)
whether application will ensure that the victim's losses are equitably borne
by those benefiting from the enterprise responsible for the injury.1'3 These
considerations support application of the doctrine of respondeat superior to
financial elder abuse cases. Exposing insurance companies that employ
agents who commit financial elder abuse furthers the policy objectives of
the doctrine by encouraging companies to better train, monitor, and super-
vise their employees.
Despite almost universal precedence to the contrary, there is legal au-
thority for the proposition that apparent authority is the exclusive basis for
holding an employer vicariously liable for an employee's fraud. 133  In
Grease Monkey International, Inc. v. Montoya,"3 ' Arthur Sensenig was
President, Chief Operating Officer, and Chairman of the Board of Grease
Monkey from 1983 through 1991. Sensenig had broad authority to act as
general officer and agent, and raise capital for the company from banks and
other lenders, including private citizens like the Montoyas. 35
From 1983 through 1991, Sensenig secured payments from Mr.
Montoya, representing that the payments were investments in Grease Mon-
130. Id. at 795-96 (citation omitted).
131. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 553 So. 2d 537, 541 (Ala. 1990); Inter Moun-
tain Mortgage, 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 790; Baker v. Stewart Title & Trust Properties of Phoenix,
Inc., 5 P.3d 249 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000).
132. Farmers Ins. Group v. County of Santa Clara, 906 P.2d 440, 454-55 (Cal. 1995).
133. See Grease Monkey Int'l, Inc. v. Montoya, 904 P.2d 468 (Colo. 1995). For a
detailed discussion of this theory, see Charles Davant IV, supra note 115.
134. 904 P.2d 468 (Colo. 1995).
135. Mr. Montoya met Arthur Sensenig in the mid 1960s. At that time, Sensenig was
a teller at a bank where Mr. Montoya was a customer. During the 1960s and 1970s, Sensenig
gave Mr. Montoya investment advice. Montoya was impressed by Sensenig and his progress
at the bank. Sensenig, before leaving the bank, ultimately achieved the position of bank
vice-president. Id.
[Vol. 2007:683
Fall] Company Liability for a Life Insurance Agent's Financial Abuse 709
key. Sensenig secured the payments by representing to Mr. Montoya that,
because Grease Monkey was a new company, it did not have its own bank
accounts, and that as its President and Chairman of the Board, he used his
personal account as the corporate account. Sensenig, in furtherance of his
fraudulent scheme, took Mr. Montoya to Grease Monkey's offices and
showed him a promotional slide show presentation used by Grease Monkey
to solicit franchise business.
After writing out an investment check, the Montoyas received a prom-
issory note as evidence of their investment. When Sensenig delivered inter-
est payments to the Montoyas, he brought charts showing the growth and
success of Grease Monkey. Mailings to the Montoyas regarding their in-
vestments were on Grease Monkey letterhead, and calls concerning the in-
vestments were made to Sensenig at Grease Monkey. Sensenig also show-
ered the Montoyas with promotional items from Grease Monkey, such as
pens, hats, and sweatshirts. Ultimately, none of the money paid by Mr.
Montoya to Sensenig was invested in Grease Monkey. Rather, Sensenig
used it for his personal benefit. Consequently, the Montoyas filed suit
against Grease Monkey, as Sensenig's employer, for breach of contract,
fraud, misrepresentation, breach of duty of good faith, promissory estoppel,
extreme and outrageous conduct, and negligent hiring and supervision. At
trial, the Montoyas prevailed on their fraud and misrepresentation claims.
According to the Colorado Supreme Court in Grease Monkey, the
facts of the case required that the concepts of principal-agent, master-
servant, and employer-independent contractor legal relationships be accu-
rately aefined and applied.'36 As observed by the Court:
Apparent authority liability is not based upon the rules of respondeat superior, and
it is not "essential to find that the agent was motivated by an intent to act for his
master's purposes." Actions for misrepresentations and fraud generally fit into the
category of torts which do not lie within the scope and principles of respondeat su-
perior. In many of these situations, the agent's position enables him to perpetrate
the fraud, and the agent acted for his own purposes. However, "[the fact that the
agent is acting from purely personal motives is immaterial unless this is known to
the other party."'
137
The Court's rationale in Grease Monkey was that "respondeat superior
and master-servant principles constitute an aspect of agency law distinct
from fraud based on the apparent authority analysis of [the Restatement
(Second) of Agency] section 261. ' I38 Pursuant to the apparent authority
theory, the liability of the principal is based on the fact that the agent's posi-
tion facilitates the commission of the fraud because from a third person's
perspective, the transaction appears normal on its face, and the agent ap-
136. Grease Monkey, 904 P.2d at 472.
137. Id. at 473 (citations omitted).
138. Id. at 473-74.
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pears to be acting in the ordinary course of business. Consequently, "the
apparent authority doctrine of section 261 sets forth the appropriate analyti-
cal framework for the present case."' 39
The drafters of the Restatement (Second) of Agency expressly recog-
nized that the factors used to determine scope of employment in the context
of respondeat superior are concerned with the "physical activities of ser-
vants."'" Since fraud was not considered to be a physical act, "special rules
which deal with situations in which the master may be liable for deceit...
and similar matters . . . are stated in Sections 246-264.14" These special
rules premise the liability of a master for the fraud of an employee on the
doctrine of apparent authority exclusively and not on respondeat superior.
Both the rule and its supporting rationale-i.e., that apparent authority and
not respondeat superior is the proper basis for holding an employer liable
for an employee's fraud-were carried over into the tentative drafts of the
Restatement (Third) of Agency. 42
B. Apparent Authority or Aided by Existence of the Agency Relationship
The Restatement (Second) of Agency section 219(2)d provides for
two different theories of liability.1 43  The first clause recognizes an em-
ployer's vicarious liability for the torts of an employee based on the doc-
trine of apparent authority, while the second creates liability for an em-
ployer whose agent was aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of
the agency relationship.1"
1. Apparent Authority
"Apparent authority is the power to affect the legal relations of an-
other person by transactions with third persons, professedly as agent for the
other, arising from and in accordance with the other's manifestations to
139. Id. at475.
140. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 229 cmt. A (1958).
141. Id.
142. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.03 cmts. a-b (Tentative Draft 2000).
143. See Doe v. Forrest, 853 A.2d 48, 51 (Vt. 2004) (adopting § 219(2)(d)); Mont-
gomery v. Shelby & Belle, LLC, No. 255278, 2005 Mich. App. LEXIS 2292 (Mich. Ct. App.
Sept. 22, 2005) (unclear if Michigan recognizes § 219(2)(d)); Mahar v. StoneWood Transp.,
823 A.2d 540, 545 (Me. 2003) (recognizing § 219(2)(d)); Payton v. N.J. Tpk. Auth., 678
A.2d 279, 283 (N.J. Super. 1996) (recognizing § 219(2)(d)); Arizona v. Schallock, 941 P.2d
1275, 1280 (Ariz. 1997) (en banc) (recognizing § 219(2)(d)); Olson v. Connerly, 457
N.W.2d 479, 482 (Wis. 1990) (recognizing § 219(2)(d)).
144. See Forrest, 853 A.2d at 51 (adopting § 219(2)(d)); Montgomery, 2005 Mich.
App. LEXIS 2292 (unclear if Michigan recognizes § 219(2)(d)); Mahar, 823 A.2d at 545
(recognizing § 219(2)(d)); Payton, 678 A.2d at 283 (recognizing § 219(2)(d)); Schallock, 941
P.2d at 1280 (recognizing § 219(2)(d)); Olson, 457 N.W.2d at 482 (recognizing § 219(2)(d)).
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such third persons."'45 Apparent authority and respondeat superior are both
interrelated doctrines of vicarious liability in that either would hold an em-
ployer liable for the harm caused by an employee committed with apparent
authority and while acting in the scope of his or her employment.'46 Be-
cause the doctrines lead to the same legal consequence (employer liable or
employer not liable) and are based on the rationale that, as between two
innocent parties-the principal-master and the third party-the principal-
master, who, for his own purposes, places another in a position to do harm
to a third party, should bear the loss, the doctrines are viewed as alternative
theories of liability.'47 However, while the same fact pattern can support
application of both doctrines, there are instances where apparent authority
would create employer liability while respondeat superior would not.'48
There is an important practical distinction between determining vi-
carious liability for harm caused by a third party's voluntary interactions
with a purported agent, as in the case of fraud or misrepresentation, and
those that are inflicted on a third party who has made no choice to deal with
the agent, as in the case of a car accident. It is only in the former instance-
voluntary interaction with the agent-that apparent authority is particularly
appropriate because the principal's conduct and the third party's ability to
assess the agent's authority bear on the liability of the principal. Conse-
quently, apparent authority and respondeat superior are not equivalent. A
servant or agent may sometimes act within the scope of his employment and
still lack apparent authority. The inverse is equally possible.
Apparent authority, unlike respondeat superior, is not limited by the
requirements of control or scope of employment.'49 Likewise, while re-
spondeat superior cannot apply absent the requisite relationship, apparent
authority may apply even though no relationship exists between the princi-
pal and the apparent agent.' Apparent authority gives a purported agent
the power to affect the principal's legal relationship with a third person.
145. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8 (1958).
146. See Kansallis Finance Ltd. v. Fern, 659 N.E.2d 731, 734-35 (Mass. 1996).
147. See, e.g., Bozarth v. Harper Creek Bd. of Ed., 288 N.W.2d 424, 425 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1979); Forrest, 853 A.2d at 51; Lamoreux v. Oreck, 717 N.W.2d 853, 853 (Wis. Ct.
App. 2006); J. L. Querner Truck Lines, Inc. v. Safeway Truck Lines, Inc., 168 A.2d 216, 224
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1961); Sports Car Ctr. of Syracuse, Ltd. v. Bombard, 672
N.Y.S.2d 201, 203 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998); Kansallis, 659 N.E.2d at 735.
148. See, e.g., Kansallis, 659 N.E.2d at 735; Parlato v. Equitable Life Assurance
Soc'y of the U.S., 749 N.Y.S.2d 216, 221 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002).
149. See Parlato, 749 N.Y.S.2d at 221; Forrest, 853 A.2d at 70; Kansallis, 659
N.E.2d at 735.
150. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8 cmt. a (1958); see also Brown v. Saint
Vincent Hosp., 899 So. 2d 227, 238 (Ala. 2004); State ex rel. Medlin v. Little, 703 N.W.2d
593, 597 (Neb. 2005); Walson v. Walson, 556 S.E.2d 53, 56 (Va. Ct. App. 2001); Roessler v.
Novak, 858 So. 2d 1158, 1161 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003); Indep. Fire Ins. Co. v. Able Mov-
ing & Storage Co., 650 So. 2d 750, 753 (La. 1995).
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The power arises from the principal's manifestations to third persons about
the relationship. Apparent authority to perform an act exists when a princi-
pal's conduct causes a third person to reasonably believe that the agent has
the authority upon which he or she purports to act. 5'
Most courts rely upon the doctrine of apparent authority as recognized
in the Restatement (Second) of Agency section 261 as the basis for holding
an employer liable for an employee's fraud committed outside the scope of
employment. 5 Section 261 provides: "A principal who puts a servant or
other agent in a position which enables the agent, while apparently acting
within his authority, to commit a fraud upon third persons is subject to li-
ability to such third persons for the fraud."' 53
The principle of law set forth in section 261 is applicable whenever
the agent is acting within the scope of his agency." The rationale underly-
ing section 261 is that "the agent's position facilitates the consummation of
the fraud, in that from the point of view of the third person the transaction
seems regular on its face and the agent appears to be acting in the ordinary
course of the business confided to him."'55 Therefore, "the principal is sub-
ject to liability under the rule stated in this Section although he is entirely
innocent, has received no benefit from the transaction, and, as stated in Sec-
tion 262, although the agent acted solely for his own purposes. '"156
Generally, in order to establish apparent or ostensible authority, the
plaintiff must prove that (1) the principal manifested his consent to the ex-
ercise of such authority or knowingly permitted the agent to assume the
151. See Tex.-Tenn. Intl., Inc. v. Marshall C. Rardin & Sons, Inc., No. 12431, 1986
Ohio App. LEXIS 7994 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 20, 1986); Roessler, 858 So. 2d at 1161; Link
v. Kroenke, 909 S.W.2d 740, 745 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995); Milliken Group, Inc. v. Hays Nissan,
Inc., 86 S.W.3d 564, 568 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001); Alexander v. Tri County Coop., 609 So. 2d
401, 403 (Miss. 1992).
152. See, e.g., Leafgreen v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 393 N.W.2d 275, 277 (S.D.
1986); Parlato, 749 N.Y.S.2d at 221; Lucas v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 442 P.2d 460,
463 (Haw. 1968); Buckeye Union Ins. Co. v. SCOA Industries, Inc., 1975 Ohio App. LEXIS
7266 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 4, 1975); Blackburn v. Dean Witter, 201 Cal. App. 2d 518, 521
(1962); Grease Monkey Int'l, Inc. v. Montoya, 904 P.2d 468, 472 (Colo. 1995).
153. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 261 (1958).
154. See, e.g., Leafgreen, 393 N.W.2d at 277; Parlato v. Equitable Life Assurance
Soc'y of the U.S., 749 N.Y.S.2d 216, 221 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002); Lucas, 442 P.2d at 463;
Buckeye, 1975 Ohio App. LEXIS 7266; Blackburn, 201 Cal. App. 2d at 521; Grease Mon-
key, 904 P.2d at 472.
155. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 261 cmt. A (1958). See also Leafgreen,
393 N.W.2d at 277; Parlato, 749 N.Y.S.2d at 221; Lucas, 442 P.2d at 463; Buckeye, 1975
Ohio App. LEXIS 7266; Blackburn, 201 Cal. App. 2d at 521; Grease Monkey, 904 P.2d at
472.
156. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 261 cmt. A (1958). See also Leafgreen,
393 N.W.2d at 277; Parlato, 749 N.Y.S.2d at 221; Lucas, 442 P.2d at 463; Buckeye, 1975
Ohio App. LEXIS 7266; Blackburn, 201 Cal. App. 2d at 521; Grease Monkey, 904 P.2d at
472.
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exercise of such authority; (2) the third party knew of the facts, and acting
in good faith, had reason to believe, and did believe, that the agent pos-
sessed such authority; and (3) the third party, relying on such appearance of
authority, changed his position to his detriment."' The appearance of ap-
parent authority is measured by the standard of reasonableness; it is only the
manifestations of the principal that created the appearance that must be rea-
sonable.' Under section 261, whether the agent's fraudulent conduct
seems regular, and whether the agent appears to be acting in the ordinary
course of the business confided to him, is evaluated through the eyes of the
third party. 159
"While the boundaries of a principal's liability under this rule are not
easily drawn, as the Reporter's Notes to section 261 suggest, they do ex-
ist:,,"6
It is difficult to state more definitely than is done in this section the limits of liabil-
ity. It would seem to be clear that if the agent is purporting to act as an agent and
doing the things which such agents normally do, and the third person has no reason
to know that the agent is acting on his own account, the principal should be liable
because he has invited third persons to deal with the agent within the limits of
what, to such third persons, would seem to be the agent's authority. To go beyond
this, however, and to permit the third persons to recover in every case where the
agent takes advantage of the standing and position of his principal to perpetuate a
fraud would seem to go too far .... In some cases the situation is ambiguous: the
agent performs his primary function as an agent.., acting within the scope of his
powers as such agent without loss to the other from the transaction itself, but the
transaction is used as a means by which the agent may defraud such other. If in
such cases the principal benefits from the agent's act, his liability to the extent of
the benefits received is clear. If, however, the principal is not benefited, and the
transaction which actually causes the loss is not one in which the agent purports to
represent the principal, liability should not follow.1
6
1
Considerations of fairness, practicality and public policy are relevant
in ascertaining the limits of the employer's liability for an employee's fraud
under section 261.162 In cases dealing with extreme criminal or tortious con-
157. See Tex.-Tenn. Intl., Inc. v. Marshall C. Rardin & Sons, Inc., No. 12431, 1986
Ohio App. LEXIS 7994, *9-10 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 20, 1986); Roessler v. Novak, 858 So.
2d 1158, 1161 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003); Link v. Kroenke, 909 S.W.2d 740, 745 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1995); Milliken Group, Inc. v. Hays Nissan, Inc., 86 S.W.3d 564, 569 (Tenn. Ct. App.
2001); Alexander v. Tri County Coop., 609 So. 2d 401, 403 (Miss. 1992). Cf Grease Mon-
key, 904 P.2d at 475 (for purposes of section 261 liability, "[A] plaintiff must establish that
the servant or agent was put in a position which enabled the agent to commit fraud, the agent
acted within his apparent authority, and the agent committed fraud.").
158. Kansallis, 659 N.E.2d at 734.
159. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 261 cmt. A (1958). See also Leafgreen,
393 N.W.2d at 280; Grease Monkey, 904 P.2d at 475; Lucas, 442 P.2d at 481; Dudley v.
Estate Life Ins. Co. of Am., 257 S.E.2d 871, 875 (Va. 1979).
160. Leafgreen, 393 N.W.2d at 278.
161. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, § 261 (1958) (Reporter's Notes).
162. See, e.g., Parlato, 749 N.Y.S.2d at 223.
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duct, however, some courts rely upon the rationale of Restatement (Second)
of Agency section 231 to ascertain the limits of liability under section
261.163
Section 231 focuses on the foreseeability of an agent's criminal or tor-
tious conduct from the perspective of the principal. Despite the fact that
section 261 evaluates the agent's conduct from the eyes of the third party, in
ambiguous situations section 231 's foreseeability standard is used to deline-
ate the limits of liability for acts done within the scope of an agent's appar-
ent authority. 1" The foreseeability standard requires that a nexus sufficient
to make the injury foreseeable exists between the agent's employment and
the conduct that actually caused the injury. 165 In this context, foreseeability
means that the agent's conduct must not be so unusual or startling that it
would be unfair to treat the harm caused by the injury as a cost of the em-
ployer's business. 
166
2. Aided by the Existence of the Agency Relationship
The second phrase of section 219(2)d-aided in accomplishing the
tort by the existence of the agency relationship--has been subjected to both
broad and narrow interpretations.167 According to the broad interpretation,
the phrase should not be read in a manner which would render it superfluous
to apparent authority. 168 In other words, it is not merely a refinement of
apparent authority.'69 With its genesis deeply rooted in cases involving sex-
ual harassment, 7 ' the broad interpretation recognizes that imposing liability
on an employer where the employee is aided in accomplishing the tort by
the existence of the agency relationship is not restricted to a particular type
of case.'7
While no definitive standard for determining application of the "aided-
by-agency-relations" doctrine has been articulated under the broad interpre-
163. See, e.g., Lou-Con, Inc. v. Gulf Bldg. Servs., Inc., 287 So. 2d 192, 200 (La. Ct.
App. 1973); Leafgreen, 393 N.W.2d at 278.
164. See, e.g., Lou-Con, 287 So. 2d at 200; Leafgreen, 393 N.W.2d at 278.
165. Leafgreen, 393 N.W.2d at 278.
166. Id.
167. See, e.g., Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998) (rejecting the
narrow interpretation and holding that the phrase covers not only cases involving abuse of
apparent authority, but also cases in which tortious conduct is made possible or facilitated by
the existence of the actual agency relationship); Doe v. Forrest, 853 A.2d 48 (Vt. 2004); cf
Mahar v. StoneWood Transp., 823 A.2d 540 (Me. 2003) (adopting a narrow interpretation of
the phrase).
168. Faragher, 524 U.S. 775.
169. See, e.g., id.
170. See, e.g., Faragher, 524 U.S. 775; Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S.
742 (1998); Doe, 853 A.2d 48.
171. See, e.g., Faragher, 524 U.S. 775; Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742; Doe, 853 A.2d 48.
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tation, the rationale and logic of the sexual harassment cases suggest that the
mere fact that an employer creates an employment relationship alone is in-
sufficient as a test.172 These cases also suggest that in order to avoid making
employers liable for all intentional torts of an employee in all circum-
stances, policy considerations must be weighed in assessing whether the
"aided-by-agency-relations" doctrine is applicable. 73 Relevant policy con-
siderations include: (1) position, power, and authority of the employee; (2)
whether it is fair to impose the cost of injury on an employer; (3) the role
the employment relationship played in the commission of the tort; (4) the
opportunity the employer had to guard against the misconduct; and (5)
whether imposing liability would serve as an incentive for those in a posi-
tion to prevent the injury to do SO.174
In Mahar v. StoneWood Transport,'75 the Maine Supreme Judicial
Court adopted an alternative interpretation, or narrower version. In Mahar,
the plaintiffs were victims of road rage perpetrated by defendant's em-
ployee, an independent contractor. Following an entry of summary judg-
ment in favor of the defendant StoneWood, the Mahars appealed.
According to the court in Mahar, "[c]omment e to section 219(2)(d)
acknowledges that the section is limited in its application to cases within the
apparent authority of the employee, or when the employee's conduct in-
volves misrepresentation or deceit."' 176 As provided:
Clause (d) includes primarily situations in which the principal's liability is based
upon conduct which is within the apparent authority of a servant, as where one pur-
ports to speak for his employer in defaming another or interfering with another's
business. See §§ 247-249. Apparent authority may also be the basis of an action
of deceit (§§ 257-264), and even physical harm. See §§ 265-267. In other situa-
tions, the servant may be able to cause harm because of his position as agent, as
where a telegraph operator sends false messages purporting to come from third per-
sons. See § 261. Again, the manager of a store operated by him for an undisclosed
principal is enabled to cheat the customers because of his position. See § 222. The
enumeration of such situations is not exhaustive, and is intended only to indicate
the area within which a master may be subjected to liability for acts of his servants
not in scope of employment.
77
Despite the plain language of comment e, which specifically states
that the "enumeration of such situations is not exhaustive," the Mahar court
concluded that the aided-by-agency-relations clause of section 219(2)(d)
was inapplicable. 78 The court's refusal to apply section 219 to the facts of
172. See, e.g., Faragher, 524 U.S. 775; Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742; Doe, 853 A.2d 48.
173. See, e.g., Faragher, 524 U.S. 775; Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742; Doe, 853 A.2d 48.
174. See, e.g., Faragher, 524 U.S. 775; Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742; Doe, 853 A.2d 48.
175. 823 A.2d 540, 541-42 (Me. 2003).
176. Id. at 546.
177. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(d) cmt. e (1958).
178. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(d) cmt. e (1958); Mahar, 823 A.2d
at 546.
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Mahar does not negatively impact the applicability of said section in the
context of financial elder abuse cases. The Mahar court acknowledged that
section 219 is merely limited in its applicability to cases within the apparent
authority of the employee or when the employee's conduct involved misrep-
resentation or deceit,'79 the latter of which typifies a financial elder abuse
case.
C. Direct Liability
Direct liability applies to instances where the employee is acting out-
side the scope of his or her employment. It is universally recognized that an
employer is directly liable where he or she intended the conduct or the con-
sequences of the tortious act. Because direct liability on the intent theory is
fairly open and shut it will not be discussed. The direct liability of an em-
ployer for the acts of an employee can be asserted on the basis of a number
of negligence theories. For example, claims for negligent hiring, retention,
training, and supervision are common features of the common law land-
scape. 180
Because the basis of these claims sounds in negligence, the complain-
ing party must prove that (1) the employer had a duty to prevent an unrea-
sonable risk of danger to third persons that the employer knew or should
179. Mahar, 823 A.2d at 546; see also Brock v. Difani, No. CA98-351, 1999 Ark.
App. LEXIS 37 (Ark. Ct. App. Jan. 20, 1999).
180. See, e.g., Brezenski v. World Truck Transfer, Inc., 755 A.2d 36 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1999); Keller v. Koca, 111 P.3d 445 (Colo. 2005); Miller v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 580
N.W.2d 233 (Wis. 1998); Haverly v. Kaytec, Inc., 738 A.2d 86 (Vt. 1999); Kiesau v. Bantz,
686 N.W.2d 164 (Iowa 2004); Young v. Lemons, 639 N.E.2d 610 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994); Saine
v. Comcast Cablevision of Ark., Inc., 126 S.W.3d 339 (Ark. 2003); Turner v. Pendennis
Club, 19 S.W.3d 117 (Ky. Ct. App. 2000); Mainella v. Staff Builders Indus. Servs., Inc., 608
A.2d 1141 (R.I. 1992); Crist v. Hunan Palace, Inc., 89 P.3d 573 (Kan. 2004). See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 213 (1958):
§ 213. Principal Negligent or Reckless
A person conducting an activity through servants or other agents is subject to li-
ability for harm resulting from his conduct if he is negligent or reckless:
(a) in giving improper or ambiguous orders [or] in failing to make proper regula-
tions; or
(b) in the employment of improper persons or instrumentalities in work involving
risk of harm to others:
(c) in the supervision of the activity; or
(d) in permitting, or failing to prevent, negligent or other tortious conduct by per-
sons, whether or not his servants or agents, upon premises or with instrumentalities
under his control.
A small minority of jurisdictions do not recognize negligent hiring, supervision, or training
as distinct and independent torts. See, e.g., Mahar v. StoneWood Transp. 823 A.2d 540 (Me.
2003); Gray v. Rhoads, No. 99-95, 2001 Va. Cir. LEXIS 300 (Va. Cir. Ct. July 2, 2001);
Harrison v. Broadband Servs., No. 01-05-00016-CV, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 4690 (Tex. Ct.
App. June 1, 2006).
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have known the employee would harm; (2) the employer breached that duty;
(3) the breach caused in fact and was the proximate cause of the harm; and
(4) damages occurred.' "Liability exists only if all the requirements of an
action of tort for negligence exist.' 8 2 In the specific context of negligent
hiring, supervision, and training, the plaintiff, in addition to the foregoing
proof requirement, must demonstrate that the employee committed an un-
derlying tort or compensable wrongful act that caused his or her injury. 183
In essence the plaintiff must prove a case within a case. 18
4
The most difficult aspects of the negligence claim to satisfy are duty
and legal cause. Consequently, these aspects-to the exclusion of the issues
of breach of duty and damages-will be discussed next.
1. Duty
The primary element in every negligence claim is that the defendant
owed a duty of care to the plaintiff. The concept of duty is merely "an ex-
pression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the
law to say that the plaintiff is entitled to protection" from the harm suf-
fered. "'85 Duty is not a strict or rigid concept that remains static over time,
but rather is a malleable concept that "must of necessity adjust to the chang-
ing social relationships and exigencies and man's relation to his fellow
.... ,6 In the context of direct liability for negligence, the question of
whether the employer owes the third party a duty to exercise reasonable
care can be ascertained from the perspectives of (1) foreseeable risks, or
(2a) limited duty/special relationship.8 7
a. Foreseeable Risks
The common law imposes a duty on all persons not to subject others
to unreasonable risks of harm from their actions. In this context, whether a
life insurance company owes a third party a duty depends on issues of
knowledge and risk. The question is whether the company knew or should
have known that its action or inaction would subject another to an unrea-
181. See, e.g., Zarzana v. Ashley, 218 S.W.3d 152 (Tex. Ct. App. 2007).
182. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 213 cmt. a (1958). Haverly, 738 A.2d at
91.
183. Miller v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 580 N.W.2d 233 (Wis. 1998); Haverly, 738
A.2d 86; Kiesau, 686 N.W.2d 164; IMT Ins. Co. v. Crestmoor Golf Club, 702 N.W.2d 492
(Iowa 2005); Host Marriott Corp. v. Meadows, No. 05-00-00959-CV, 2001 Tex. App.
LEXIS 4409 (Tex. Ct. App. June 29, 2001).
184. Kiesau, 686 N.W.2d 164.
185. KEETON ET AL., supra note 94, at 358.
186. Gooden v. Tips, 651 S.W.2d 364, 371 (Tex. App. 1983).
187. KEETON ET AL., supra note 94, at 169-73, 356-59.
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sonable risk of harm. In determining whether the law is justified in impos-
ing a duty of care, courts engage in a rather complex analysis that balances a
number of factors, including: (1) the nature of the underlying risks of harm;
(2) the foreseeability and severity of the harm; (3) the magnitude of the bur-
den of guarding against injury or harm; (4) the relationship between the
parties; (5) and ultimately, based on considerations of public policy and
fairness, society's interest in the proposed solution.'
While no one factor is dispositive, foreseeability of risk is a pivotal is-
sue"' in assessing whether the court should impose a duty on insurance
companies to exercise reasonable care to protect their customers from fi-
nancial elder abuse. A particular risk or injury is foreseeable if its character
can reasonably be anticipated from objective analysis. The ability to antici-
pate or foresee the risk may be based on an actual awareness of the risk, or
the defendant may be charged with constructive knowledge, such as where
the defendant is in a position to know of the risk. Typically, when the risk
of harm is that posed by third persons, a plaintiff may be required to show
that the defendant was in a position to know that there was a likelihood that
such conduct would occur.
The empirical data discussed in Parts I and II supports the conclusion
that financial elder abuse is a foreseeable risk. This data justifies a standard
of foreseeability that is based on special knowledge or special reason to
know that a particular plaintiff or identifiable class of plaintiffs will suffer a
particular type of harm. It is not necessary that the defendant anticipate the
precise injury, the extent of the harm, or the actual manner in which it oc-
curs. Foreseeability merely requires that one anticipate or should have an-
ticipated that an injury of an appreciable magnitude might result from his or
her conduct. 90
b. Limited Duty/Special Relationship
The common law has long recognized that there is no duty to control
the conduct of a third party to protect another from harm, except where the
defendant stands in some special relationship with either the person whose
conduct needs to be controlled, or in a relationship with the intended victim
of the conduct that gives the victim a right to protection. 9' The foregoing
188. See J.S. v. R.T.H, 714 A.2d 924 (N.J. 1998); Keller v. Koca, 111 P.3d 445
(Colo. 2005); Althaus v. Cohen, 756 A.2d 1166 (Pa. 2000).
189. Keller, 111 P.3d 445; Hartsfield v. McRee Ford, Inc., 893 S.W.2d 148 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1995); Duncan v. Rzonca, 478 N.E.2d 603 (Ill. Ct. App. 1985); Gomez v. Ticor, 193
Cal. Rptr. 600 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
190. See, e.g., Endresen v. Allen, 574 P.2d 1219 (Wy. 1978); Gulf Refining Co. v.
Williams, 185 So. 234 (Miss. 1938).
191. See, e.g., Brezenski v. World Truck Transfer, Inc., 755 A.2d 36 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2000); Tarasoffv. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
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rule of non-liability recognizes an exception where a special relationship
exists between the employer and the actor or between the employer and a
foreseeable victim of the actor's conduct.'92 In the context of financial elder
abuse by life insurance agents, life insurance companies share a special rela-
tionship with both the victim and the perpetrator.
As a general rule, the triangular relationship between the insurance
company, agent, and insured, in and of itself, will not justify imposing a
fiduciary duty on insurance companies.193 The rationale for this rule is that
the relationship between the company and insured is an arms-length,
buyer/seller one. This typically does not rise to the level of a fiduciary rela-
tionship in which a special confidence and trust are invested in the integrity
of one in a superior position.194
2. Proximate Cause
Proximate cause is closely related to the issue of duty. The questions
of duty and proximate cause are related because they both depend in part on
foreseeability' 95 In every case, the issue of proximate cause initially in-
volves an inquiry into the question of cause in fact. If this inquiry demon-
strates that the defendant's conduct was not a factor in causing the plain-
tiff's injury, the matter ends. If, however, it is shown that the defendant's
conduct was a factor in bringing about the plaintiffs harm, the legal inquiry
continues to the question of whether the defendant's conduct played such a
role as to make him or her liable for the damages. One widely accepted
definition and test for proximate cause is that the defendant's conduct was
the proximate cause if it was a substantial factor in bringing about the harm
and there is no rule of law relieving the defendant from liability because of
the manner in which his or her negligence resulted in injury.'96
192. See, e.g., Brezenski, 755 A.2d 36; Tarasoff, 551 P.2d 334.
193. See Douglas R. Richmond, Trust Me: Insurers Are Not Fiduciaries to Their
Insureds, 88 KY. L.J. 1 (1999); Johnny C. Parker, Does Lack of an Insurable Interest Pre-
clude an Insurance Agent From Taking an Absolute Assignment of His Client's Life Policy?,
31 U. RICH. L. REv. 71, 100-03 (1997).
194. See, e.g., Mentis v. Del. Am. Life Ins. Co., No. 98C-12-023 WTQ, 1999 Del.
Super. LEXIS 419 (Del. Super. Ct. July 28, 1999); Synder v. Webb, No. 97APE09-1248,
1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 2776 (Ohio Ct. App. June 18, 1998); Rabouin v. Metro. Life Ins.
Co., 699 N.Y.S.2d 655 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999).
195. See Moning v. Alfono, 254 N.W.2d 759, 765 (Mich. 1977); Powell v. Standard
Brands Paint Co., 212 Cal. Rptr. 395, 396-97 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985); Calkins v. Cox Estates,
792 P.2d 36, 38 (N.M. 1990); Stahlecker v. Ford Motor Co., 667 N.W.2d 244, 252-53 (Neb.
2003).
196. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 (1965). See also Caldwell v. Ford
Motor Co., 619 S.W.2d 535, 541 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981); Anaya v. Superior Court, 93 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 228, 229 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000); McKenna v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft,
558 P.2d 1018, 1022 (Haw. 1977); Weaver v. McClintock-Trunkey Co., 11l P.2d 570, 573
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As to the question of causation in the context of a claim for negligent
hiring, supervision, retention, or training against the employer and em-
ployee, the issue is "whether the failure of the employer to exercise due care
was a cause-in-fact of the wrongful act of the employee that in turn caused
the plaintiffs injury.""'9 The employee's act-whether intentional or negli-
gent--does not alter the underlying negligence claim against the em-
ployer.'98 Consequently, there must be a causal link between the em-
ployee's wrongful act that harmed the plaintiff and the employer's negligent
hiring, supervision, or training of the employee.'99
D. Non-Delegable Duty
The non-delegable duty doctrine provides that while a party may con-
tract out of the performance of a non-delegable duty, he or she may not con-
tract out of legal responsibility for any injury arising out of the perform-
ance.2"' The doctrine is an exception to the common law rule that an em-
ployer is not liable for the tortious conduct of an independent contractor.20'
The non-delegable duties exception refers to duties for which an employer
must retain legal responsibility, despite proper delegation to another. While
there are no general rules as to what constitutes a non-delegable duty, 202 it is
universally recognized that a non-delegable duty can arise from contract,
(Wash. 1941); Canada v. Royce, 257 P.2d 624, 627 (Or. 1953); Deutsch v. Shein, 597
S.W.2d 141, 144 (Ky. 1980); Vincent ex rel. Stanton v. Fairbanks Mem'l Hosp., 862 P.2d
847, 851 (Alaska 1993); Henry v. McCrudden, 575 A.2d 666, 669 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990),
petition for appeal denied, 585 A.2d 470 (1990); Kiamas v. Mon-kota, Inc., 639 P.2d 1155,
1159 (Mont. 1982); Weaver v. Arthur A. Schneider Realty Co., 381 S.W.2d 866, 868-69
(Mo. 1964); Barnes v. Gulf Power Co., 517 So. 2d 717, 721 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987)
(Ervin, J., concurring); Lacy v. District of Columbia, 424 A.2d 317, 320 (D.C. 1980);
Donnini v. Ouano, 810 P.2d 1163, 1166 (Kan. Ct. App. 1991); GKC Mich. Theaters v. Grand
Mall, 564 N.W.2d 117, 120 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997); Boyden v. Tri-State Packing Supply, No.
CV-04-452, 2007 Me. Super. LEXIS 47 at *6 (Me. Super. Feb. 28, 2007); Hembree v. The
Celotex Corp., No. 12641, 1992 Ohio Ct. App. LEXIS 3716 *2 (Ohio Ct. App. July 14,
1992); Huey v. Milligan, 175 N.E.2d 698, 703 (Ind. 1961); Barrett v. Harris, 86 P.3d 954,
960-61 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004).
197. Miller v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 580 N.W.2d 233, 238 (Wis. 1998).
198. See Gomilla v. Libertas, 621 N.W.2d 386 (Wis. Ct. App. 2000).
199. Miller, 580 N.W.2d at 238-39.
200. Bouziden v. Alfalfa Elec. Coop., Inc., 16 P.3d 450, 455 (Okla. 2000); M.S. v.
Nova Se. Univ., 881 So. 2d 614, 620 (Fla. App. 2004).
201. Parker v. Neighborhood Theatres, Inc., 547 A.2d 1080, 1082-83 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1988); Meyers v. City of Tempe, 128 P.3d 751, 755 (Ariz. 2006); Mutual Ins. Co. v.
Hunt, No. 5-2000-07, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 4038, at *3 (Ohio. Ct. App. Sept. 7, 2000);
Jackson v. Power, 743 P.2d 1376, 1383 (Alaska 1987).
202. See Rangolan v. County of Nassau, 749 N.E.2d 178, 183 (N.Y. 2001); Jackson,
743 P.2d at 1384.
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voluntary assumption, statute, or the common law. 03 Whether a duty is
non-delegable, from a common law perspective, ultimately turns on public
policy.2 4 The exception is premised on the theory that certain duties of an
employer are so vital or important to the community that the employer may
not escape liability by delegating performance to another.2 5
The agency principle of non-delegable duties avoids the problems of
fragmentation or leniency that accompany the employer liability standards
of respondeat superior, direct liability, and agency.
The Restatement (Second) of Agency states:
The words "non-delegable duty" do not imply that there are duties which cannot be
discharged by appointing others to perform them. They describe duties the per-
formance of which can properly be delegated to another person, but subject to the
condition that liability follows if the person to whom the performance is delegated
acts improperly with respect to it.
206
Non-delegable duties are a function of a special relationship between the
person who owes the duty and the one to whom the duty is owed.0 7
Although the concept of non-delegable duty exists in theory in the
context of corporate liability for employee fraud, in reality it has not been
applied to impose liability on an insurance company for the conduct of its
agents. This may, however, be a consequence of the availability of other
more widely accepted legal doctrines, but the non-delegable duty doctrine
still provides a sound and innovative approach to recovery for employee
fraud against elderly clients.
CONCLUSION
We have an epidemic in this country that is silent, deadly and devastating and its
name is financial elder abuse. It does not discriminate on the basis of race, creed,
color, religious preference, or sexual orientation. It crosses all socio-economic
borders and will strike the wealthy and the poor alike. It is increasing at an un-
precedented rate and, as of this writing, there is no cure.
208
Elder abuse of any type flies in the face of all that is good. Elders are
special targets and tend to suffer more severely when they are victimized.
203. See Jackson, 743 P.2d at 1383; Hayes v. Goldstein, 697 N.E.2d 224, 225 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1997).
204. See Rangolan, 749 N.E.2d at 183.
205. See Jackson, 743 P.2d at 1384; Majorowicz v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 569 N.W.2d
472, 476 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997).
206. Justin Weddle, Note, Title VII Sexual Harassment: Recognizing an Employer's
Non-Delegable Duty to Prevent a Hostile Workplace, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 724, 743 (1995)
(quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY).
207. Weddle, supra note 206, at 743.
208. Kim R. Hubbard, Columns: President's Page: A National Disgrace-Financial
Abuse of the Elderly, 46 ORANGE COuNTY LAW. 5 (June 2004).
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The problem of financial elder abuse by life insurance agents is not about to
go away. The empirical data suggests that as Americans age and take pos-
session of greater wealth, the problem will reach epic proportions. The
problem of financial elder abuse is a normative one that easily figures into
practical reasoning, that is, reasoning about what ought to be done. The
answer to the question "what ought to be done?" is quite simple. The law
must hold institutions such as life insurance companies accountable where
their agents engage in financial elder abuse of an insured. If ultimate ac-
countability were placed on the employing company to exercise care in the
training, supervision, and monitoring of its agents, then major advances in
curtailing the problem would certainly occur.
Practical reasoning leads to legal reasoning (i.e., how to achieve the
desired result) that takes place at a more concrete level. The doctrines of
respondeat superior, direct liability, non-delegable duty, and apparent
agency, properly employed, afford greater protection by further insuring
that victims of financial elder abuse will be compensated for their harms.
Each incorporates the principles of equity and fair dealing. Each relies on
public policy as a basic component of its mode of operation. Each strikes a
balance between the problem and the ability of a life insurance company to
prevent the problem.
We all hope to reach old age, and to enjoy the best quality of life pos-
sible when we get there. We trust in the law to brighten our prospects.
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